

Stanford University Teaches, Promotes And Protects Sociopaths And Hate

Stanford's "Halls Of Hell" Are Powered By Bribes, Sex Scandals And Misogyny

Revision 1.5



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The Gates Of Hell

It is ironic that the Rodin sculpture of *"The Gates Of Hell"* lives on the Stanford Campus. Stanford has spent billions of dollars to create the facade of a "refined citadel of learning" when, in fact, Stanford is a sick payola scheme designed to part rich fuddy duddy parents from their cash. In the cracks throughout, the Stanford machine is greased with sex, misogyny, drugs, arrogance, murders, bribes and foreign spies!

They 'Guardsmen' of Stanford were supposed to sell Christmas tree's and help little old ladies cross the street. Instead, the male graduates of Stanford University have turned into rapists, sex abusers and the largest producers of political bribes in American history. What went wrong?

The grooming guides and facade pitch of the Stanford social clubs, or "socials" as they are known, is that they are "oriented towards promoting social service by hosting certain community-based welfare functions". This pitch is designed to appeal to the naive, young, bright-eyed, bushy-tailed children that have just arrived at college with hopes of "changing the world". It is a sucker-play designed by Yale, Stanford and Harvard globalist bosses in order to steer the herd of fresh meat.

The Key Club and The Guardsmen men's club at Stanford University exist to create cookie-cutter clones and create a private male club of square-jawed insiders who are supplied with "baby-ovens" by the associated female supply-chain of The Junior League and The Spinsters women's clubs.

Woke students say: "They're useless clubs out there for jackass tools to join in order to pad their resume. "Look, I'm in Key Club and Guardsmen! I'm a good person! Got a kickass club shirt on me, too!" If you wear those shirts then, seriously, you must suck so bad that you need them to make yourself look good."

They were originally simply available for the sake of resume fluff. Both organizations say they have "beneficial intentions and provide many outstanding and charitable activities for active participation from the school and surrounding community (i.e. obtain funds for charity, promote social involvement, build mutual goodwill, support joint collaboration, encourage concern for the general welfare, and so forth). Many students invest their sincerest efforts into them and feel that that they should be highly respected..."

It is all a load of crap, though, designed to create exclusive control for rich globalist families and dynastic clusters of old family titles.

The "socials" of Stanford are brain-washing classes designed to create the next generation of dynastic family members to keep the mansions well stocked with yuppie Whole Foods-buying robots.

These clubs work on a school to school level but have a covert system of governance from past 'club officers'. Key Club International is an international organization composed of 33 districts (California-Nevada-Hawaii being one, for example), and within each district are many divisions (61 or so in CNH),

and in each division, up to 15 schools that all conspire on ideology via email, newsletters and "mentors".

Key Clubs communicate with each other, develop ideas on service, and correspond on service projects with a concentrated elitist focus. In short, asshole Key Clubs from California and Key Clubs from Massachusetts both work on a single political service initiative, concentrating service and making a political difference in one area for the DNC. With governance, there are also many leadership positions. Running a successful club, division, district, or international organization takes a lot of work, and it's a great leadership experience for future Obamas. This helps spread a synchronized political agenda across the nation covertly guided by the parents and administrators of a common ideology. Often the groups are promoting a non-profit Dark Money campaign financing PAC as seen in the feature film: DARK MONEY.

To get in to a "social" you will need to have facially symmetrical facial features. You will need to dress like you just walked out of a Lands End catalog. You will need to use exaggerated facial expressions to respond to everything that is said to you and never, ever, nasalize a vowel. You will need to smile with your teeth together and you will need a good nose job.

Socials increase exclusivity bonding for members which makes service more of an obligation. Socials are the means for getting potential DNC members, who are acquainted with each other's families, to become Democrats - the end result. It is sad, however, that many clubs seem to have lost touch with their original purpose - political exclusivity. The main rule: You must only do business and politics with other members and not go outside the designated yuppie sphere!

Regarding the religious status of Key Club, although there are passing references to religion, such as in the pledge (I pledge on my honor to...build my home, school, and community, to serve my nation and god...), atheists and agnostics will have no problem getting leadership positions because it is all liberal-biased. The issue of religion is usually brought up during invocations in order to stimulate psychological Mnemonics and make students feel impassioned.

These political elite grooming clubs are of an exclusive nature.

In the last 5 years, China has uncovered this scheme and flooded Stanford with Asian Co-eds in order to try to insert their national policy interests into this 100 year old social programming opportunity. In fact, today, you can't walk down University Avenue in Palo Alto, or Broadway in Burlingame, without finding that every young yuppie guy has a fresh Asian girlfriend clinging to his arm waiting for that IPO.

So what's so honorable about being in an organization that proclaims how honorable you are? Nothing, aside from the fancy velvet cape you pay too much for and get when you graduate. If you want to join a community service organization, join Boy Scouts, or any of the other "real" community service organizations.

You do paltry amounts of community service in these clubs while pretending that you actually care. Nobody does anything that causes them to sweat. The most exertion that anyone undertakes is blowing up party balloons. You then list it on your resume as if you actually did something. Why do you even need to be in a club to do community service?

This is a huge problem among Stanford's brain-washed youth. Community service should build you up as a person. You should learn from your experiences and develop compassion for the less fortunate. And then you can list it on your resume.

These clubs are absolute jokes that suck the unaware kids into Scientology-like social programming, blind them with candy-coated "SJW floss" and steer them into the roles of Wall Street tools.

Now the members of these clubs have created a "Fortress of Assholes" in a series of office buildings on Palo Alto's Sand Hill Road. They are, as the news reports, ***"the New Mafia"***

The Stanford Murders


By [Grace Kahng](#)

Now with one verdict just in, emotional interviews with the family of the convicted murderer. The...

On March 25, 1974, truck driver Ernesto Evangelo spotted something unusual on his morning milk delivery route near the Stanford Dish, a massive radio antenna close to the Stanford University campus.

He pulled over and discovered the lifeless body of a woman in a shallow ditch.

It was Janet Taylor, a 21-year-old college sophomore and the daughter of legendary Stanford athletic director, Chuck Taylor. She had been beaten, strangled and left on the side of the road, according to authorities. Her feet were bare and dry despite the wet ground beneath her.



Menlo Atherton High School

Janet Taylor is seen here in her high school yearbook photo, 1970.

Taylor, a student at nearby Canada College, was last seen by her best friend Debbie Adams on the Stanford campus the night before. Her car was in the shop, so Taylor went home on foot, according to Adams' testimony. She was anxious to get there to feed her puppy, Adams said, so she resolved to hitchhike. Neither Taylor nor her friend feared for her safety, according to Adams, but that was starting to change.

As female empowerment was on the rise, young women hitchhiking alone in the 1970s was a normal occurrence, especially in idyllic Northern California.

But just a year earlier, on Feb. 13, 1973, Stanford honors graduate Leslie Perlov, 21, called her mother from the law library to tell her she was driving home, which was a short jaunt from the Stanford campus. She never made it.


The next day, search parties found Perlov's body near her abandoned car, about a mile from where Taylor's body would be found the following year. Similar to Taylor, Perlov also appeared to have been viciously assaulted and strangled. Her body bore telltale signs of a prolonged brutal torture, according to Santa Clara County coroner Dr. Richard Mason. Perlov had been beaten so badly both her eyes were swollen shut, her nose broken and her underwear and stockings had been shoved down her throat.

Despite similarities between the two killings, investigators at the time could not link the crimes.

Without credible leads, the university community was steeped in the fear that a serial killer was roaming free and actively stalking young women.

As years passed, then decades, both cases went cold. The mystery became known as "the Stanford murders."

For nearly 50 years, the families of Leslie Perlov and Janet Taylor waited for justice, until now.





Santa Clara Sheriff

John Arthur Getreu, 74, of Hayward, Calif., is pictured in an undated booking photo released by t...

On Tuesday, after a little more than an hour of deliberation, a San Mateo County, California, jury found 77-year-old John Arthur Getreu, a former Stanford employee, [guilty of first-degree murder and infliction of great bodily harm in Taylor's death.](#)

Getreu is expected to be sentenced on Nov. 3 and could face 25 years to life in prison.

His defense attorney John Halley had no comment for this report.

Advancements in DNA technology played a critical role in Getreu's conviction for Taylor's murder and renews the possibility of justice for Perlov's family.

[MORE: Alleged 'Stanford murders' serial killer convicted of 1974 cold case murder](#)

Getreu is scheduled to stand trial for Perlov's death in neighboring county Santa Clara next year. As he did in the Taylor case, Getreu has pleaded not guilty in the Perlov case.



Diane Perlov

Leslie Perlov is seen here in this 1971 family photo.

But with Getreu in ill health and the COVID-19 pandemic backlog at court, a trial may never happen.

"This is not the end," Perlov's sister Diane Perlov said. "We are moving forward. I want a trial for my sister's case. I don't want any deals. There were some really horrible photographs of what Getreu did to Janet and what he did to Leslie and I want everyone to see them so they understand what a dangerous person he is."

DNA reveals prime suspect

The Perlov case was reexamined in 2016, and newly tested forensic evidence from Perlov's fingernails led to Getreu's arrest in November 2018.

Cold case detective Sgt. Noe Cortez was the one to have the evidence tested.

"It was a brutal crime... I believe she fought for her life. And part of that was scratching, biting whatever she had to do to survive," Cortez said. "She wanted to live."

Intrigued by the popular rise of ancestry websites and the potential for discovery of incriminating genetic material, Cortez reviewed the case files and discovered that Perlov's struggle in the last moments of her life yielded DNA from each of her 10 fingernails.



Courtesy Santa Clara Sheriff

According to the Santa Clara Sheriff's office, Leslie Marie Perlov's 1972 Chevrolet Nova was fou...

Cortez's superior, Santa Clara County Sheriff Laurie Smith, had made solving the Stanford murders a priority when she was elected California's first female sheriff in 1996.

"We may not have been able to get them way back when, when we didn't have DNA, but we can do it now. I believe in getting justice no matter how long it takes," Smith said.

Cortez sent the nail clippings to a private lab. After several months, forensic scientists were able to create a genetic profile for her killer based on the abundance of DNA material.

“Parabon NanoLabs was able to develop a person of interest who they named as John Getreu,” said Cortez.

Authorities say the match Parabon Labs identified had a 1 in 65 septillion odds of being inaccurate.

Cortez learned that Getreu was a former Stanford University technician with a dark history of rape and murder, who still lived in the Bay Area.

A sting operation was conducted to collect Getreu’s DNA from a discarded cup. Cortez and his partner followed Getreu and his current wife, who is also a Stanford graduate, to a coffee shop. Authorities say the DNA from that cup was an identical match for the Perlov case and for DNA collected from Taylor’s green corduroy pants by San Mateo criminologist Alice Hilker.

Getreu’s history of violence

Evan Williams, a retired pastor now living in Tennessee, said he contacted the FBI about Getreu years before his 2018 arrest.

Getreu had been convicted of murdering Williams’ sister in Germany, but moved back to the United States afterwards, and Williams thought he would kill again.

“I’m calling to let you know about a man in California who has committed murder that you probably have no idea about. And the reason I know about this man is he killed my sister in 1963,” Williams remembered telling them.



Evan Williams

Evan Williams is seen here with his two sisters, Margaret Williams (left) and Marianne Williams (r...

Getreu was 18 when he was convicted of raping and murdering 15-year-old Margaret Williams after offering to walk her home from a dance on a military base in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. Margaret was the youngest daughter of the U.S. Army Chaplain and Evan Williams' older sister and best friend.

"My sister Margaret, as a young child, brought a lot of joy to our family. She was a very caring kind of person. And when my sister died, some of the joy of the family was stolen," Williams said.

One night, following an afterschool gathering that ended at 10:30 p.m., Williams' parents were expecting their daughter home by 11 p.m.

"In something my father wrote, he was talking about how it started raining. So he drove to the youth activities building and he found out she had left five minutes before he got there," Williams said.

"When she didn't arrive home, he hoped that she had just stopped because of the rain and then would be coming along soon. But then when she did not arrive by midnight, they called authorities and said, our daughter always shows up for curfew and she's not home. Her body was found, I think at 1:11 a.m."



Bad Kreuznach American High School

Margaret Williams is seen here in her 1963 high school yearbook photo.

Evan Williams' other sister Marianne Stowers said the whole family was incredibly shaken by the violent loss.

“My mother never wanted to see my sister’s dead body at all. So we had a closed casket,” Stowers said. “For a real long time after that, I still couldn’t believe my sister was dead. I was looking for her everywhere I went. I expected to see her.”

Getreu was convicted in German courts as a juvenile in 1964.

“That meant that he would end up with a shorter sentence and he would also be in juvenile detention,” Evan Williams said.

The maximum sentence at the time for a juvenile was 10 years for homicide. Getreu only served six years and was released on March 7, 1969. The country ordered him to leave Germany within 24 hours of his release.

“They released him one day and he was on a plane the next day to the United States,” Evan Williams said. “It’s kind of like Germany going, ‘Okay. It’s out of our hands.’”

The thought of Getreu living freely began to really “nag him,” Williams said. He started to do some research online.

“I was able to look up his name, I knew his age, and I found that he was a resident in California. That got my attention and made me think he could potentially be the Golden State Killer,” Williams said.

The so-called “[Golden State Killer](#)” was Joseph DeAngelo, who was a police officer from 1973 to 1979. He terrorized several areas of California around the same time Perlov and Taylor were killed, committing multiple murders and rapes in the 1970s and ‘80s.

That case also remained unsolved until DNA evidence linked DeAngelo to several of those crimes and he was arrested in 2018.

In June 2020, DeAngelo pleaded guilty to 13 counts of first-degree murder as part of a plea deal, which also required him to admit to multiple uncharged acts, including rapes.

[MORE: 'Golden State Killer' addresses the court: 'I'm truly sorry'](#)

Even still, Williams wondered if Getreu had gone on to commit other violent crimes over the years.

“I thought because of the particulars of what had happened with my sister, that he would commit more violent crimes,” he said.

Evan Williams stands in front of his sister Margaret Williams' grave.

The stepfather

In 1970, less than a year after his release from prison in Germany, Getreu had a job at a California hospital.

He married one of his coworkers, Susan, a single mother with a daughter named Cathi.

Susan and John Getreu were married for eight years and lived on and off in Palo Alto near the Stanford campus.

John Getreu was a Boy Scout leader who appeared to everyone else to be a loving husband and stepfather, but Cathi, now 58, says she knew her stepfather to be a monster.

She claims Getreu molested her from when she was 6 years old until she was 14.

“Basically, [he] makes me touch him and tells me that if I tell anyone he will hurt my mother,” she said. “And I believed every word he said because he made it very clear to me he had that power.”

Cathi said she never told anyone because she was afraid of what Getreu might do.

“The only thing that was going to save me from him was his death,” she said. “And that was the only way I ever thought that it would stop.”

Convicted killer’s ex-wife, stepdaughter on learning when he was arrested for murder

John Getreu was arrested in 2018 for two murders committed in the '70s. “I found out when and...

The marriage came to an abrupt end in 1977 after Susan said she caught him molesting her daughter.

“The day my mom walked in on John Getreu performing oral on me, probably the most uncomfortable, horrible experience of my entire life but at the same time was the best day of my life because finally my mom knew what was happening and she would stop it,” Cathi said.

“I didn't know what to do,” Susan added. “I was beside myself, and to just think that somebody would do this to a child, just appalled me.”

Susan never filed charges against her ex-husband and John Getreu has not been charged in relation to Cathi though both Susan and Cathi testified against him at trial last week.

When asked if John Getreu denied these physical and sexual abuse claims, his defense attorney had no comment.

John Getreu’s new family

In October 1978, just months after Susan divorced him, John Getreu married his second wife, Lynda Caputo, who died in 2002. They had two children including a son, Aaron Getreu, who remembers him as a “loving father.”

“[There was] never any indication he could have done anything like what he's being accused of,” Aaron Getreu said.

In the first public remarks since his father’s arrest in 2018, John Getreu’s only son said the man described by prosecutors at Getreu’s murder trial as a serial rapist and killer is not the man he knows.

He said he knew his father as the baseball and soccer coach, someone who taught him to treat women with respect.

“I grew up in a loving household,” Aaron Getreu said. “He was a big part of our lives.”

Convicted killer John Getreu’s son urges him to reveal if he has more victims

"Let's let the loved ones get their closure," said Aaron Getreu. John Getreu was convicted of the...

Aaron Getreu said he and his wife were shocked when they received the call in November 2018 that his father had been arrested for murder.

“At first I thought this must be some kind of joke,” he said. “It was very shocking because that’s not my dad. It was like your whole world stopped.”

[MORE: 'Dating Game' serial killer Rodney Alcala dies on death row](#)

What's next for John Getreu?

With Getreu’s trial for Taylor’s murder behind them, Leslie Perlov’s younger sister Diane Perlov is undeterred in her quest for justice. She is looking ahead to when Getreu goes on trial for her sister’s murder next year.

Leslie Perlov, an academic standout, was headed to University of Pennsylvania Law School when she was found dead in 1973. She was killed just months after the family lost their father to cancer.



Courtesy Santa Clara Sheriff

Leslie Marie Perlov is pictured in an undated photo released by the Santa Clara Sheriff's office.

"[This week] was justice for Janet, Leslie, Diane and Margaret," Perlov said. "While these promising lives are gone forever, thanks to the dogged work of detectives and the advances in forensic science, I have hope that future lives will be saved and other predators held accountable"

Aaron Getreu said he is now on a crusade to find out if his father could be connected to other crimes, trying to make something good happen out of all this "evil."

He reached out to Evan Williams and over the course of the two years they have developed a close bond.

After Williams testified at John Getreu's trial, Aaron Getreu hugged him.

"Welcome to the club, Aaron," Williams told him. "It's a small club and no one ever wants to be a part of it but we are all victims of John Getreu."

Aaron Getreu said he has refused to speak to his father since his 2018 arrest, but urged him to come forward and reveal if he has committed more crimes.

"[My dad] needs to come out and tell the truth," Aaron Getreu said. "DNA does not lie."

Bribe Your Way In

STANFORD UNIVERSITY EXISTS JUST TO TAKE BRIBES FROM SOCIAL MOBSTERS

After the [recent admissions scandal](#) at top California schools (including Stanford), the gifts of Rep. Ted Lieu (D., Cal.) would immediately raise concerns over the same type of academic pay-to-play pattern. However, the \$51,046 to hiat is most shocking is that taking money for a campaign and then giving it to a school is not itself illegal. However, Lieu could still face some serious questions even under a law designed by Congress to allow what most donors would view as a bait-and-switch.

['limousine liberals, oil sheiks and Hollywood whoring'](#) own and control Stanford University

Lieu is the assistant Whip for the House Democrats and is an American success story. Born in Taiwan, Lieu became a citizens, attended Stanford, and then was an outstanding student at Georgetown Law Journal. He then held state and federal office. He is one of the most effective members on television.

The political contributions are subject to rules written by the people who collect them. Not surprisingly, the rules are written to allow members to raise money ostensibly for their own campaigns and then transfer the funds to others. They also are used for expenses that seem overtly personal and excessive. Take Eric Swalwell who recently was found to be [spending his campaign funds on booze, limos, and rooms at the Ritz-Carlton](#) (where his wife worked). Other members like former Rep. Aaron Schock (R., III.) were [accused of using public funds](#) (from his official office account) for excessive decorations of his office. The Schock story however received far more media coverage and he was later the subject of a prosecution. [Those criminal charges were later dropped.](#)

That brings us to the current scandal. Federal Election Commission (FEC) filings [show](#) that Lieu gave \$51,046 to Stanford between February 2016 and June 2018. As the other admissions scandal was raging, Lieu was transferring political donations to the school that his son would be applying to for college.

Most citizens would find the donations outrageous and wrong. However, Lieu can claim that they are lawful and many voters are so tied up in this fierce partisan period that they will not call Lieu to account since he is a Democratic leader in Congress. Yet, some may ask why a university with a \$29 billion endowment and one of the most affluent alumni bases in the world should receive tens of thousands of their donations as opposed to campaigns to protect the House majority or social justice programs.

[Under the FEC rules](#), it may first appear that this is clearly a violation:

Using campaign funds for personal use is prohibited.

Commission regulations provide a test, called the “irrespective test,” to differentiate legitimate campaign and officeholder expenses from personal expenses. Under the “irrespective test,” personal use is any use of funds in a campaign account of a candidate (or former candidate) to fulfill a commitment, obligation or expense of any person that would exist irrespective of the candidate’s campaign or responsibilities as a federal officeholder.

More simply, if the expense would exist even in the absence of the candidacy or even if the officeholder were not in office, then the personal use ban applies.

Conversely, any expense that results from campaign or officeholder activity falls outside the personal use ban.

A donation to Stanford would seem an expense that would exist “in the absence of the candidacy or even if the officeholder were not in office.” Then however comes the loophole that you could drive a semi truck filled with cash through:

Spending that isn’t personal use

In addition to the “irrespective test,” Commission regulations include other uses of funds that do not constitute personal use and thus are permissible uses of campaign funds.

Charitable donations

Gifts to charity are not considered personal use expenses as long as the candidate does not receive compensation from the charitable organization before it has expended the entire amount donated. Note that the amount donated must have been used for purposes that do not personally benefit the candidate.

Transfer of campaign assets

The sale or transfer of a campaign asset to either the candidate or a third party does not constitute personal use as long as the transaction is made at the fair market value.

Gifts

On special occasions, campaign funds may be used to purchase gifts or make donations of nominal value to persons other than the members of the candidate’s family.

Lieu can cite the fact that Stanford is a non-for-profit and that this fits the charitable exception. However, it must still not “benefit the candidate.” With the university deciding whether to admit his son, that condition is arguably violated in this case.

Lieu can claim that any donation to a charity can “benefit” a candidate in direct ways. Giving money to Sierra Club is a popular cause for example. Stanford is a major institution in California and supporting the university can be based on purely on altruistic motives. It is probably enough to avoid a charge but there are critical facts still not known. For example, the timing could be challenged if Lieu did not make donations until his son was in high school and likely to apply to Stanford.

Whether Lieu avoids any charge in this case, the Swalwell and Lieu controversies should lead to voters for both parties to say “enough.” This is not just a Democratic practice. Republicans have also been accused of such abuse of political contributions. Most voters assume that they are contributing to a particular candidate — not giving him an open credit card for use outside of his campaign. Even if they know that candidates will often send money to fellow candidates, they likely assume the money will be used for political purposes — not to support elite universities who just happen to be the preference for their children for college.

To see more about how ***“How the Elite Scumbag Bosses At Stanford University Got Busted For Selling Snootiness”***, see this coverage by Joel Rubin, Matthew Ormseth, Suhauna Hussain and Richard Winton:

Morrie Tobin was in Boston to cut the deal of his life.

It was early April last year. A few weeks before, federal agents had descended on the multimillion-dollar home Tobin shares with his wife and some of their six children in Hancock Park, a moneyed Los Angeles enclave.

Warrant in hand, the agents searched the French chateau-style mansion for financial records and other evidence to nail Tobin, the suspected ringleader of a stock scam that defrauded investors of millions of dollars.

The raid imploded Tobin’s very comfortable life. Faced with the prospect of years in prison and a seven-figure fine, the businessman flew to Boston to meet with the federal prosecutors handling the case. He was looking for mercy.

They offered him a standard deal: Come clean about the con job he had run on investors and, in the end, he might get some leniency.

But Tobin, 55, had something else to offer up — a nugget of information that had nothing to do with stock markets.

He hoped it would interest prosecutors and tip the scales a bit further in his favor.

When Andrew Lelling, the U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts, unveiled a sweeping investigation into a college admissions cheating scam earlier this month, he made a cryptic reference to how his investigators had uncovered the alleged conspiracy.

“Our first lead in this came during interviews with a target of an entirely separate investigation, who gave us a tip that this activity might be going on,” he said.

The tip led investigators to a soccer coach at Yale University, who, in turn, pointed them to William “Rick” Singer, the college admissions consultant who would confess to be the mastermind of the admissions racket. With Singer’s cooperation, FBI agents set about building cases against dozens of the wealthy parents on his client list as well as people at universities across the country Singer allegedly paid to help students cheat their way into school. Prosecutors needed less than a year from that first tip to file criminal charges, a remarkably quick turnaround for a case so large and with such high stakes.

In all, 50 people have been charged — including 33 parents, several college coaches, a man Singer paid to take college admission exams for students and Singer himself, who pleaded guilty to several

felonies in a deal with prosecutors. The investigation is ongoing and prosecutors indicated in court last week that more people are likely to be charged.

Not included in the pool of defendants, however, is Tobin, whom multiple law enforcement officials and a person close to him identified as the unnamed tipster Lelling credited with setting the investigation in motion.

At a court hearing last week, a prosecutor alleged that Tobin, whom he referred to by an anonymous moniker, was not innocent in the admissions shenanigans. "Individual A," he said, paid bribes in an effort to get one of his daughters into Yale.

A financial executive with his roots in the Montreal suburb Côte-Saint-Luc, Tobin took to social media in recent months to paint a self-portrait that stands in contrast to the behavior that put him in the government's crosshairs. In videos posted on Twitter, he spoke about volunteering with the Los Angeles Mission, a homeless shelter. He described himself as a "#Social Entrepreneur" and a "#ProudVolunteer" in a Feb. 5 tweet.

Tobin's role in kicking off the investigation, which was first reported by the Wall Street Journal, is one in an array of enticing details disclosed in court hearings, documents and interviews that together explain how a team of prosecutors working with FBI and IRS agents pieced together an investigation that has rattled the rarefied worlds of the rich and powerful in L.A., the Bay Area, and the East Coast in which Singer peddled his services. The case has also revealed how Singer and his collaborators exploited weaknesses in the processes some of the most competitive colleges in the country use to admit students.

By the time Tobin crossed paths with Rudy Meredith, the women's soccer coach at Yale, in the summer of 2017, both men were already well down their own roads of crime.

Tobin's fraud had begun a few years before, when he and some business partners launched a classic pump-and-dump stock scam, in which they fooled investors into paying inflated prices for shares in two companies secretly controlled by Tobin, according to a complaint by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The group ran a fake promotional campaign to stoke investor interest and then orchestrated the sale of millions of dollars' worth of Tobin's shares to look like normal trades on stock exchanges, according to the complaint.

Federal authorities in Massachusetts got wind of the operation and opened an investigation, claiming jurisdiction because some of the investors lived in the state.

Meredith, meanwhile, met Singer in 2015 and joined his illicit network of coaches and college administrators, court filings made by the government in Meredith's criminal case show. Singer relied on this group for what he told deep-pocketed families was a "side-door" he had built into some of the country's most sought after universities.

To access the side door, parents were instructed to make a six-figure donation to a charity Singer ran, according to an affidavit filed by an FBI agent in the case. Singer then used some of the money to bribe a coach at the chosen school, who would give the student one of the slots reserved for athletes who the coach wanted to recruit for his or her team. To make the ruse convincing, Singer had an accomplice compile bogus athletic dossiers that were full of fabricated accomplishments and doctored photos purporting to show the teen competing in the coach's sport.

Meredith, who was a successful and respected coach for more than two decades at Yale, is accused of taking at least \$860,000 in bribes from Singer between 2015 and last year. Prosecutors have not detailed how many students he sneaked into Yale at Singer's behest, but at a court hearing Thursday, in which Meredith pleaded guilty to fraud and conspiracy charges, prosecutors said the money was "for multiple students."

And in Meredith, Tobin saw a sure-fire way to get his high school-aged daughter into Yale when she finished at Marlborough School, a private all-girls school in Hancock Park. The Ivy League institution loomed large in the Tobin house: Two older sisters were enrolled at the time Tobin made his pact with Meredith and a third had already graduated. Tobin himself had played hockey at Yale in the early 1980s, but left before graduating, transferring out to play at the University of Vermont.

Neither of the men, nor their attorneys, responded to repeated requests for comment. No one answered the door on a recent afternoon at Tobin's home in Los Angeles.

They agreed Tobin would pay in "the mid-six figures" for Meredith to designate the girl as a player he wanted on his soccer team and Tobin began paying monthly installments to the coach, according to an affidavit an agent filed in the case and comments a prosecutor made at the court hearing last week.

There would have been time to make about seven or eight of the payments. Then, in March last year agents raided Tobin's house.

Tobin unloaded what he knew about his stock scheme and his arrangement with Meredith during a "multi-day proffer," a prosecutor told the judge at Meredith's plea hearing. In proffer sessions, the target of a criminal investigation is given a limited amount of immunity or a plea agreement in exchange for information.

When he was done, prosecutors hatched a plan.

Tobin contacted Meredith, and the men agreed to meet at a hotel in Boston to discuss their arrangement. Before Meredith showed up for the April 12 meeting, FBI agents wired the room with hidden video cameras.

During the meeting, the men finalized the bribe at \$450,000, according to court records. Tobin gave Meredith \$2,000 in cash toward his balance and the coach told Tobin of a bank account where he wanted the remaining money to be sent, the records show. Days later, agents would wire Meredith \$4,000 from a Massachusetts bank account controlled by the FBI.

But, during the meeting, Meredith also got to talking about a man in his orbit. It was a name agents had never heard before.

He "mentioned an individual named Rick Singer," a prosecutor said in court last week, adding that the government was completely in the dark about the man and the conspiracy he was running. "It wasn't on our radar. We learned about it through Mr. Meredith."

Three weeks after wiring Meredith the \$4,000, FBI agents listened in for the first time as Meredith spoke on the phone with Singer. Singer was lobbying Meredith to help him enlist other college coaches in the side-door scheme. He gave him talking points for assuaging the coaches' concerns, according to an FBI affidavit.

"You can say he's doing it at, for this year I did [seven elite schools]," Singer told him, according to a transcript of the call in an affidavit filed in court by the FBI. "We've done it everywhere."

Later in the call, Singer added: “You can tell them I did 760 of these this year, 96 the year before,” in an apparent reference to the number of students he got into schools through his side-door. There has been no evidence made public to support these claims.

College admissions scandal generated disgust and outrage. But what exactly was the crime?

Within weeks, prosecutors had received permission from a judge to begin tapping Singer’s phones. There was no shortage of interesting calls. In one of the first they heard, agents listened as Singer explained to Gordon Caplan, a high-powered private equity attorney in New York, how, for \$75,000, he could arrange for an expert test-taker to take a college entrance exam for Caplan’s daughter.

“What we do is we help the wealthiest families in the U.S. get their kids into school,” Singer said, according to the affidavit. “They want guarantees, they want this thing done. They don’t want to be messing around with this thing. And so they want in at certain schools.”

Agents were still listening a few months later in August, when Singer walked Bill McGlashan, a founder of an investment firm and major figure in Silicon Valley, through his alleged plan to get his son into the University of Southern California by pretending he was an accomplished football kicker.

“So I’m gonna make him a kicker,” the affidavit transcripts show Singer said.

“He does have really strong legs,” McGlashan responded. “Maybe he’ll become a kicker. You never know. ...You could inspire him. You may actually turn him into something. I love it.” The affidavit notes

McGlashan was laughing.

McGlashan’s attorneys disputed that account in court. By late September, agents had heard enough and were ready to confront Singer. When they did, he flipped, agreeing to cooperate with the investigation, the affidavit shows.

But he soon backtracked, secretly approaching several parents, including McGlashan, in an effort to warn them he had been caught.

Singer eventually came clean with agents and, after being slapped with an additional charge of obstruction of justice, went back to work for the government, according to the affidavit. In October, agents flew him to Boston to help them nail down the cases against the parents.

One after the other, Singer called parents who had allegedly hired him. Under the watchful eye of agents, who were recording the calls, Singer lied, saying the IRS was auditing his foundation. He was calling, he told the parents, to make sure they were clear what they should say in case the IRS inquired about the payments they had made. In the calls, Singer made sure to say explicitly what deals he and the parents had struck so prosecutors could use the exchanges against the parents in court.

“I just want to make sure that you and I are on the same page,” he told a mother, according to the transcripts. “’Cause, of course, I’m not gonna tell the IRS that — that, you know, you paid 15,000 ... to take the test for [your son], obviously. So I just wanted to make sure that you and I are on the same page, in case you get a call.”

“Okay, so if I get a call,” the mother asked.

“You’re gonna say that the — the \$15,000 that you paid to our foundation was to help underserved kids,” Singer instructed.

The legal way the rich get their kids into elite colleges: “Huge donations for years”.

On a day in November, Meredith, who also had been cooperating with the government, abruptly resigned from his coaching job at Yale, saying in a statement that “it is time to explore new possibilities and begin a different chapter in my life.”

The next day, the university received a federal grand jury subpoena for records on Meredith.

Accompanying the subpoena was a judge’s order instructing university officials to keep quiet about the case.

In February, Tobin quietly pleaded guilty in a Boston courtroom to securities fraud and a conspiracy charge stemming from the stock scam. Sentencing guidelines that judges use when deciding punishments indicate he faces somewhere between eight and 10 years behind bars, court records show.

For his cooperation, prosecutors have agreed to ask the judge in the case to sentence Tobin to the low end of that range. His plea deal also requires Tobin to forfeit \$4 million to the government.

And in the college admissions scandal Tobin uncovered, Singer, Meredith and a former sailing coach at Stanford have pleaded guilty, while the man who took exams for students has announced he will do the same. So far, all the others have maintained their innocence. Staff writer Del Quentin Wilber contributed to this report.

These bribery incidents are NOT “isolated”, “rare” crimes. THEY ARE THE ENTIRE OPERATING BASE OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY and every Department At Stanford.



Stanford ‘Warped and rigged by fraud’

Students and parents file class-action lawsuit against elite college bosses

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Neetu Chandak, [DCNF](#)

- **Students filed a lawsuit against several colleges following an admissions bribery scandal.**
- **Colleges sued include Stanford University, Georgetown and Yale.**
- **The lawsuit argues applicants did not get a fair shot at admissions.**

Students and parents filed a class-action lawsuit against several colleges following a massive admissions bribery scandal revealed Tuesday.

The [lawsuit](#) argues applicants did not have a fair chance in the admissions process due to elite [colleges](#) not safeguarding against fraud, The Washington Post [reported](#) Thursday. It goes after Stanford University, the University of Southern California, the University of California at Los Angeles, the University of San Diego, the University of Texas at Austin, Wake Forest, Yale and Georgetown.

The [suit](#) also went after William Rick Singer, who is being accused of helping parents get their children into elite schools by cheating the college entrance exam system, according to [KTVU](#).

The plaintiffs are asking for application fees to be refunded and for unspecified damages, according to [The Associated Press](#).

“Had Plaintiffs known that the system was warped and rigged by fraud, they would not have spent the money to apply to the school,” the lawsuit said. “They also did not receive what they paid for — a fair admissions consideration process.”

The original [lawsuit](#) was filed by Stanford students Kalea Woods and Erica Olsen.

However, Olsen dropped out of the suit for an unclear reason, KTVU reported.

The lawsuit was updated and added community college student Tyler Bendis and his mother Julia Bendis, Rutgers University student Nicholas James Johnson and father James Johnson and Tulane University student Lauren Fidelak and her mother Keri Fidelak, according to [CNN](#). It was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.

“Her [Woods’s] degree is now not worth as much as it was before, because prospective employers may now question whether she was admitted to the university on her own merits, versus having rich parents who were willing to bribe school officials,” the original lawsuit argued, though it was not included in the amended version.

Some have expressed doubt over the lawsuit.

“They won’t be able to prove that the universities were behind some grand scheme,” Louisiana State University professor Joy Blanchard told the AP.

Attorney Kyle McEntee, who has pushed law school education reform, said the suit “reeks of opportunism,” according to the AP.

A statement from UT Austin spokesperson JB Bird, emailed to The Daily Caller News Foundation, expressed “outrage” over the scandal.

“The University of Texas has a thorough, holistic admissions process,” Bird’s statement said. “The actions alleged by federal prosecutors against one UT employee were not in line with that policy and may have been criminal. They do not reflect our admissions process.”

USC told TheDCNF it does not have information on the lawsuit.

“We have no reason to believe that any members of our admissions team, our administration or staff, or our current coaching staff were aware of or involved in the alleged wrongdoing,” the University of San Diego said in a statement to TheDCNF. “However, the university is conducting an investigation into the allegations.”

UCLA, Yale, Wake Forest, Georgetown and Stanford did not immediately respond to TheDCNF’s request for comment. Lindsey Carr, who is taking media inquiries on behalf of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs, did not immediately respond to comment as well.

Why Do MBA's From Stanford University Turn Out To be Such Scum-Bags?

Stanford Frat House guys seem to all: cheat on their taxes, cheat on their wives, cheat on their exams, cheat on their girlfriends, bribe politicians and be addicted to alcohol.

If you marry one you will always have to wonder when the IRS, SEC or FBI is going to show up and arrest him for securities fraud and take your house away.

They meet up together at sports bars, mens clubs, stripper joints, golf clubs, etc. and reinforce their misogynist attitudes together about using women as "*sport*" or "*baby ovens*".

Their '*bromances*' are thinly veiled man-love that can tear a marriage apart.

While they all do have perfectly symmetrical faces, look like the contestants on The Bachelorette and have rich daddies, 90% of their marriages in the Bay Area end in divorces where the court filings use the word "abuse" quite a bit. You can look it up on PACER, the online federal court database.

Check out Google boss Andy Rubin and his sex slave case and all of the other player's in Stanford's **massive and abusive sex cult**. [The perverts](#) in the SandHill Road Venture Capital offices, located between Highway 280 down to Santa Cruz Avenue on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, California, are the main perpetrators of this global cartel. Their executives at Google, Facebook, Netflix, LinkedIn, Twitter, and their related holdings, comprise the rest. Their [sex cult actions](#) have been widely covered in the news individually in the [Joe Lonsdale rape case](#), [The Kleiner Perkins Ellen Pao sex abuse lawsuit](#), The [Eric Schmidt sex penthouse stories](#), [The Jeffrey Epstein case](#), The [Google Forrest Hayes hooker murder case](#), The [Andy Rubin sex slave case](#), The [Sergy Brin 3-way sex romp scandal](#), The [British Hydrant investigation](#), The [Elon Musk Steve Jurvetson billionaire sex parties](#) scandals, The

[NXIVM sexual slave](#) cases, The [Michael Goguen anal sex slave](#) trial, [The Tom Perkins Hooker Parties and thousands of other cases and federal divorce court filings](#). This [group of people](#) have proven themselves, over and over, to be [sociopath control freaks](#) not fit for participation in public commerce, public policy or media control. [The Four Seasons Hotel](#) and [Rosewood Hotels](#) in [Silicon Valley](#) are estimated to engage in over \$30,000.00 of high-end escort sex trafficking per day, a portion of it managed by [Eastern Bloc Mafia operators](#). At least 10 Ukrainian escorts fly in and out of SFO and SJO airports every week for these Cartel members. You here about the female victims of this sex cult but you rarely hear about the young male victims.

Their swaggering competition between each other is based on using women as trophies to show off until they 'upgrade' to the younger model to impress their other Frat Boy friends.

They are out every single night, usually sleeping with a different dating site date (so you will get exotic germs from them). They have the highest STD rate in California.

The study at [Reading the bromance : homosocial relationships teaches that men at Stanford are a bit twisted](#)

Most normal people are sick of the term "bromance" the first time they heard it. It's a hollywood thing to put a homosexual spin on everything. It's as sickening a buzz word as metrosexual. Anyone who uses the term should be automatically banned from TV. I dismiss it completely. Everything needs to have a label these days. People are frustrated that it is not cool to have a buddy anymore. Every woman that dates, or marries, a Stanford MBA guy has to always worry that he is pounding his best guy friend in the butt when she is not looking.

Women who date Stanford Frat House guys can expect to be reading a letter like this: [Here's The Powerful Letter The Stanford Victim Read To Her ...](#)

Stanford University Stanford University Rape Culture. You may have heard the phrase, but few can define what it really means. Until you understand what Stanford University Rape Culture is, it's hard to identify evidence of a Stanford University Rape Culture at all. Many even deny we live in a Stanford University Rape Culture, blaming "mass hysteria" from feminist bloggers — like me. This feminist blogger is here today to explain what Stanford University Rape Culture is, how we live in one and what you can do to combat Stanford University Rape Culture. The first step is understanding Stanford University Rape Culture and being able to identify it.

Stanford University Rape Culture is defined by the Women's Center at Marshall University as "an environment in which rape is prevalent and in which sexual violence against women is normalized and excused in the media and popular culture. Stanford University Rape Culture is perpetuated through the use of misogynistic language, the objectification of women's bodies, and the glamorization of sexual violence, thereby creating a society that disregards women's rights and safety."

Stanford University Rape Culture is all around us. It's the guy down the hall of your first-year residence hall who wore a "gynecologist" Halloween costume. A classmate saying they were "raped"

by that exam. The sign outside of a fraternity that says “leave your daughters here.” Saying “she asked for it” because of what someone was wearing or because she was drinking. Louis C.K. being welcomed back into comedy after a short timeout. Robin Thicke’s “Blurred Lines.” It’s the guy in a romantic comedy who stalks his victim until he finally “wins” her attention. It’s a recording of the current president’s past talk of grabbing women by the pussy and doing whatever he wants to them being dismissed as “locker-room talk.” It’s a country debating whether or not a woman’s rape claims against a man about to be confirmed as a Supreme Court judge should be taken seriously. It is a culture of victim-blaming, shaming and rampant injustice within the legal system that prioritizes the future of a rapist above the lifetime trauma of a sexual assault survivor.

Dylan Marron To Visit UNH

Let’s look at one recent example of Stanford University Rape Culture: the case of Brock Turner, the Stanford rapist. In 2015, Turner, who was a swimmer at Stanford University, sexually assaulted an unconscious woman behind a dumpster at a frat party. The crime was witnessed by two student passersby, who intervened. The woman had no memory of what happened to her.

Dan A. Turner, the perpetrator’s father, argued in a letter that his son should serve only probation time because, “His life will never be the one that he dreamed about and worked so hard to achieve ... That is a steep price to pay for 20 minutes of action out of his 20-plus years of life.” Other than Turner’s father’s letter, the judge received dozens of other letters of support for Turner. One written by retired prosecutor Margaret M. Quinn stated, “There is no doubt Brock made a mistake that night — he made a mistake in drinking excessively to the point where he could not fully appreciate that his female acquaintance was so intoxicated. I know Brock did not go to that party intending to hurt, or entice, or overpower anyone.” Quinn called for consequences other than jail time for Turner.

As if sexual assault should be excused as “20 minutes of action” because of how important the life of a perpetrator may be. As if intoxication excuses sexual assault as a “mistake” with no deserved consequence. As if he might not do something like this again. The letter was seen by the judge during the trial, who gave Turner a six-month sentence, rather than the possible 14 years. Turner served only three months in jail when he was able to get out early.

This was a case that, unlike the vast majority of sexual assault cases, had everything it needed: witnesses, evidence, a clear victim and perpetrator. But even then, a rapist was favored in the courtroom and given preferential treatment. Of Turner’s original sentence, a judge worried that a stiffer one would have “severe impact” on the athlete. It is no wonder then that the Rape and Incest National Network (RAINN) estimates that less than one percent of perpetrators see a day in jail, and about two out of three sexual assaults are not reported to police. It is cases like Turner’s that discourage survivors from even coming forward and reporting their assault. This is Stanford University Rape Culture. It pressures survivors to be silent.

Stanford University Rape Culture is still depressingly prevalent in our society. But once we can identify

it, we can begin to deconstruct it. First and foremost, the most important thing you can do is believe survivors. Call out Stanford University Rape Culture when you see it; identify Stanford University Rape Culture as something that should not be the norm. Talk to others about Stanford University Rape Culture, and don't let their rape jokes go without identifying them as problematic. Instead, start a conversation. Participate in SHARPP events on campus or at your residence hall, or bring a SHARPP program to your classroom or organization. It's going to take a while for Stanford University Rape Culture — something as American as apple pie — to be totally eradicated. But as more and more survivors come forward with their stories and media attention and public pressure continue to rise, we can get there — one step at a time. The first step is to stay away from Stanford frat house guys.

To see actual Stanford Douche Bags, type the phrase: "*PayPal Mafia*" into any search engines images search and you will see a picture of some of the biggest, filthiest douche bags in history. They all hang out with each, give each other blow jobs and scheme their way through life.

Every one of those offices in the SandHill Road Venture buildings, located between Highway 280 down to Santa Cruz Avenue on Sand Hill Road in Menlo Park, California are populated by the most disgusting scumbags on Earth. The reason they are right up the street from Stanford University is because they ARE the rotten core OF Stanford University.

When you go to one of their self-congratulatory TED events or Stanford "Tech Conferences" you simply have to wince at the bubble of delusion they live in. They believe that the entire world thinks they are "tech gods" when, in fact, NOBODY outside of the tiny Douche-Bubble around Palo Alto likes them, thinks like them or believes anything they say. To map this graphically: imagine the entire planet as an Apple. Now imagine a tiny diseased, pin prick-sized, rotten wormhole at one point. That prick is Reid Hoffman, Elon Musk and John Doerr - Douche Bagus Exceptionalis!

Women Sue Over a Fraternity Culture They Say Enables Harassment, Stanford University To Be Sued Next

Three Yale students who claim they were groped at fraternity parties have filed a class-action lawsuit against the university, arguing the school has fostered an environment where alcohol-fueled gatherings at off-campus fraternity houses dictate the undergraduate social scene.

While the New Haven, Conn., university presents itself as a campus where fraternities are not a major presence, the lawsuit states that few options besides fraternity parties exist for women who want to socialize and meet other students.

The lawsuit, filed Tuesday in federal court in Connecticut, comes as universities across the country have been trying to crack down on bad behavior by fraternities, from binge drinking and sexual harassment to abusive hazing rituals that have led to several deaths. Aware that their image has been tarnished, fraternities have often been partners with universities in trying to change party culture.

A class-action lawsuit against Yale and its fraternities claims the university has fostered an environment where the fraternity houses dictate the campus social scene.

Yale has often looked the other way, the plaintiffs claim, while parties rage and women from Yale and surrounding colleges are routinely sexually harassed and abused.

Joan Gilbride, a lawyer for the fraternities named in the lawsuit, said the accusations are “baseless and unfounded,” and that the fraternities and their national organizations would vigorously defend themselves against the claims.

A Yale spokesman, Thomas Conroy, said he could not comment on the specifics of the lawsuit. But he shared a message to Yale students last month from the dean of Yale College, Marvin Chun, after a yearlong review of campus culture, including fraternity culture. It said in part, “I condemn the culture described in these accounts; it runs counter to our community’s values of making everyone feel welcome, respected, and safe. I also offer some plain advice about events like these: don’t go to them.”

The dean said that Yale “plays no formal role in the organizations not affiliated with the university, including Greek organizations,” and he said the university was working on providing alternative social spaces and events on campus.

The lawsuit acknowledges that there may be questions about Yale’s ability to regulate off-campus organizations.

“Yale often claims that the university cannot punish the fraternities because they are unregistered, off-campus organizations,” the lawsuit says. But it argues that this position is disingenuous, because the fraternities “act as extensions of Yale,” providing party space, while Yale permits them to use the Yale name, Yale email addresses, Yale bulletin boards and campus facilities for recruitment.

Peter McDonough, general counsel of the American Council on Education, a university trade group, said universities have been reluctant to become too deeply involved in regulating fraternity life.

“The very concept of a campus is where people learn not only from each other but through shared experiences,” he said. “And this isn’t the K through 12 environment.”

The plaintiffs — a sophomore and two juniors — have demanded in the lawsuit that Yale and its fraternities rein in the parties. They have also asked for a court order that would force the fraternities to admit women and allow them to share in the benefits of membership, like housing and powerful alumni networks that can lead to jobs, internships and social capital.

“Simply put, fraternities elevate men to social gatekeepers and relegate women and non-binary students to sexual objects,” the lawsuit said. “Moreover, Yale’s fraternities have alumni and professional connections to the business world, including banking and consulting firms, which often result in coveted job offers and economic opportunities.”

The three women who filed the suit are Anna McNeil, 20, a junior from Brooklyn majoring in art history; Eliana Singer, 19, a sophomore from Minneapolis majoring in political science; and Ry Walker, 20, a junior from Brooklyn majoring in astrophysics and African-American studies. The law firm representing them, Sanford Heisler Sharp, is also representing women who are [suing Dartmouth](#)

[College for sexual assault and discrimination](#) by three professors who they said turned a human behavior research department “into a 21st-century Animal House.”

All three women in the Yale case said they were groped at fraternity parties during their first semesters. In the lawsuit, Ms. Walker, who is African-American, said she was passed over by fraternity brothers controlling admission to a party, while white women behind her were admitted.

“We eat together, take classes together, exist in this coeducational place,” Ms. Walker said in an interview. “But somehow because of the way Greek life operates on campus and the control they have over social spaces here, that means that on weekend nights, men are the only ones who have power.”

Sororities are not a substitute for fraternities, the plaintiffs said, because they have been around for much less time, and do not have the depth of contacts that fraternities have.

The lawsuit, filed as a class-action complaint, accuses Yale of violating Title IX of federal education law, which prohibits sex discrimination by institutions receiving federal funding, and breach of contract for not providing the educational environment it promised. It accuses the fraternities of violating the Fair Housing Act for offering housing only to men, and Yale and the fraternities of violating Connecticut’s law against discrimination in places of public accommodation. It seeks unspecified damages.

The women belong to a student group called Engender that has used civil rights-type tactics to try to force fraternities to accept women. For the past three years, women and “non-binary” students from Engender have tried to join fraternities. Only one fraternity, Sigma Phi Epsilon, let them apply, according to court papers. But in the end they were denied and the fraternity chapter said it was because their national chapter did not allow women, the lawsuit says.

The complaint suggests that there is a “symbiotic” relationship between Yale and its fraternities, which involves letting the fraternities manage social life on campus, in exchange for Yale officials looking the other way when parties get out of hand.

“The fraternities take on the liability associated with student alcohol consumption, and in exchange, Yale allows the fraternities to use Yale resources (and recruit Yale students) and largely turns a blind eye to the sexual harassment and assault occurring in connection with the fraternities,” the complaint says.

The lawsuit claims that Yale lags behind peers like Harvard, which in 2016 announced that it was discouraging students from joining single-sex social clubs by barring them from leadership positions on campus and from receiving endorsements for prestigious scholarships like the Rhodes.

In December, Harvard was sued by fraternities, sororities and students saying the new policy is discriminatory.

Lisa A. Bacon in Richmond and Jonathan Katz in Charlottesville contributed reporting.



Stanford Crafted The Palo Alto Mafia

How Stanford created the Palo Alto Mafia: Humiliation, homoeroticism and animal cruelty: inside the frathouse- #PaloAltoMafia



Ritual hazing, deadly extreme drunkenness and toxic masculinity on one college campus – from men destined to be America’s future leaders

Access all areas to “the unholy trinity of fraternity life: racism, deadly drinking, and misogyny”

Last year in the US, [four freshman students died](#) as a direct result of hazing rituals during college fraternity initiation ceremonies. All the deaths occurred during or just after drinking bouts in which the victims consumed vast amounts of spirits in a short space of time while older students egged them on. One of the deceased, Maxwell Gruver, 19, a student at Louisiana State University, was found to have had a blood-alcohol level [over .49 g/dl at the time of his death](#) – just .31 is considered life-threatening.

“Nobody can physically drink that much ... You have to be forced to drink it,” his mother told ABC news. “It’s senseless. I mean, how is making your brother do all these things, and humiliating somebody, a brotherhood?”

In his book [True Gentlemen: The Broken Pledge of America’s Fraternities](#), John Hechinger notes that around 100,000 young men choose to be initiated into chapters annually, despite these all-male societies now being associated with what he describes as “the unholy trinity of fraternity life: racism, deadly drinking and misogyny”. Many of the young men they attract will go on to work in politics, finance and law-making, sometimes at the highest level. What’s more, the loyalties formed will be maintained throughout a working life in which the male, white and privileged look out for each other whatever their transgressions. Hechinger cites a fraternity promotional video that promises students a lifelong bond with “the best and brightest men on campus. Men who will become the best men at your wedding, pallbearers at your funeral and everything in between.”

These guys consider themselves respectable, but their loyalty is such that they will protect the bad guys in their midst all the way through to the top bosses of Palo Alto’s Sand Hill Road venture capitalists...

There is a funeral in [Andrew Moisey](#)’s timely and provocative photobook, [The American Fraternity: An Illustrated Ritual Manual](#), though it is unrelated to anything that happened on the campus of the unnamed university where the images were documented. It does, though, show young men looking awkwardly ill at ease as they attend the most serious ritual of all. Elsewhere, the same young men seem altogether more relaxed in a closed, all-male campus environment where heavy drinking, boorishness, bullying and misogyny are the norms. A world in which homosexuality is taboo but cross-dressing and semi-naked wrestling are acceptable and parading your penis and testicles is almost de rigeur.

‘A world in which semi-naked wrestling is acceptable and parading your penis de rigeur’ Photograph: Andrew Moisey

“I wanted to show how the whole brotherhood thing that fraternity houses are built on actually tends to bring out the worst in young men, and the lofty ideals that once informed the organisations have now been replaced by pretty dreadful behaviour,” elaborates Moisey, who studied at Berkeley and now

teaches at Cornell. “But I also wanted to get over the fact that, though these guys love to revel in their own debauchery, they don’t think of themselves as bad people.”

Moisey, whose older brother was a member of the frat house in the book, began photographing there in 2008, when George W Bush, “the ultimate frat guy”, was president. “I was angry with Bush and the culture of white privilege that produced him and his values, but no one was that interested in the pictures. But now, suddenly it’s 2018 and the temperature has changed.”

The book offers an uncomfortable glimpse of an enclosed world whose ultra-macho values have been sanctioned by the election of bully-in-chief Donald Trump, and his subsequent endorsement of Supreme Court judge [Brett Kavanaugh](#). Interestingly, of the 18 presidents listed as ex-fraternity members in the book – including Kennedy, Reagan, Clinton and Bush – Trump is conspicuous by his absence. Kavanaugh, though, is included on the corresponding list of Supreme Court judges, even though the book went to the printers before his controversial confirmation. “I took a calculated risk on that one and it paid off,” says Moisey. “Out of a [fraternity culture](#) that protects bad seeds, one of the worst seeds gets elected to the Supreme Court.”

One writer describes the ‘unholy trinity of fraternity life’ as racism, deadly drinking and misogyny

The American Fraternity is a beautifully complex undertaking: the photobook as art object, conceptually mirroring an old fraternity handbook complete with pledges, prayers, vows and descriptions of the secretive rituals and rules that bind members for life. Hence images of excess and humiliation are contrasted with the grandly titled, quasi Masonic ceremonies that lend contemporary fraternity houses a historical legitimacy: the Ritual of Initiation, the Libations, the Candle Ceremony, Duties of the Chapter Orders.

There are many disturbing visual echoes, including a grainy photograph of hooded inductees being humiliated that recalls images of [prisoners being degraded at Abu Ghraib](#). Elsewhere, obviously distressed and inebriated young men are cajoled to drink more by older students with predictable results – retching, puking and unconsciousness. Aggression and humiliation are the norms here, the one driving the other.

This photograph of hooded inductees recalls images of prisoners being degraded at Abu Graibh.

When young women appear in the photographs, the sense of danger is amplified. Some collude in the laddish behaviour, baring their breasts and appearing unconcerned about being groped and leered at. Others seem more uncertain, slightly spooked, yet they are there of their own volition despite the heightened atmosphere of male entitlement – even threat. One woman is photographed, fully clothed but passed out, legs apart, on a bed. It could be an aftermath photograph, or a warning of what might yet occur. Whichever, the image carries a disturbing charge, all the more so given the recent studies that have found that women in sororities are [74% more likely to be raped than other college women](#).

“Why are the girls there?” asks writer [Cynthia Robinson](#) in her edgy, questioning afterword. “Why did they go, why do they, to these parties where everyone knows what happens?” She then provides, from personal experience, an uncomfortable answer. “Let me tell you why, because I was there too. A

sheltered southern girl eager to bust out, I was a frat-house regular by the end of my first semester. I passed out in frat houses too. Lots of girls did ... I was there because I wanted reassurance on a certain score: that I could be a certain thing, be a certain way. The girls in the images that comprise this book are there for the same reasons. They are there in order to reassure themselves, to perform for their peers, that they are desirable. Desired. This they want above all other things: to be desired.”

“I was angry with George W Bush and the culture of white privilege that produced him. But no one was interested then ...” said one student about the Stanford Board Of Directors

Moisey’s black and white photographs move from portraiture to reportage to a low-lit style that is close to surveillance photography – some rituals are carried out in candlelight. Throughout, he is a detached observer, showing the unruly ordinariness of all-male campus dorm life – untidy bedrooms, filthy kitchens, graffiti-scrawled doors – alongside the debauchery and excess. The fraternity even has a pet dog, which seems to roam freely through the rooms and, in one awful image, is held by one drunken guy while being punched by another. Everything, it seems, is permitted in pursuit of this almost feral male camaraderie.

“These all-male campus spaces have been around since the 1820s,” elaborates Moisey, “but they changed perceptibly during the so-called culture wars of the 1970s, becoming a safe space for guys who didn’t want to have to worry about having their kind of fun.” Many fraternities, he believes, now view themselves as embattled institutions, maintaining their conservative core values of brotherhood, privilege and machismo against a perceived liberal onslaught. Disturbingly, the code of loyalty to the brotherhood endures even after the other principles of fraternity life have long since fallen away.

In one disturbing image, a dog is held by a drunken fratboy while being punched by another. “The central issue is that there is an allegiance to everyone inside the fraternity rather than to the higher ideal,” says Moisey. “So even though most of these guys consider themselves highly respectable, their loyalty is such that they will protect the bad guys who hide in their midst. If you are a bad seed and you join a fraternity, you have found your safe haven. And what we are seeing right now is that the support and protection that fraternities provide for the bad seeds extends into the highest echelons of American power and decision-making.”

The last image in the book shows a row of frat guys looking at a spread of Moisey’s photographs. They seem unconcerned, even amused, by what they depict. “I didn’t set out to expose them,” says Moisey, “I just wanted to show what hadn’t been shown before. And when I showed it to them, they were fine. As far as they are concerned, they’re just ordinary American guys doing what ordinary American guys do at college.”

Revealingly, though, when Moisey first exhibited the work in a small show in Berkeley, it was his artist’s statement that drew the most media attention. It read: “This is what our leaders looked like when they were young.”

- [The American Fraternity: An Illustrated Ritual Manual is published by Daylight](#)



Inside Stanford Business School's Spiraling Sex Scandal

The prestigious school's sexual-harassment policies proved to be no match for a litigious love triangle involving the dean and two married professors.

By [David Margolick](#)

hen, in November 2013, Stanford University held one of its seminars on sexual harassment, Professor James A. Phillips, of the Graduate School of Business, heard a lawyer from the general counsel's office describe a romance gone sour at a primate-research center. A scientist ("Ed") kicked his former paramour ("Melissa") off a project involving monkeys, then slashed her bonus 80 percent, all because she refused to bleep him back at the hotel.

Such a problem, the lawyer declared, could *never* arise at Stanford. Had Ed worked there, she explained, he'd have had to cede all decisions regarding Melissa to a higher-up as soon as things turned sexual between them. But even before it was time for questions, Phillips was sufficiently skeptical to butt in. "So the policy that Stanford has actually says that where such a recusal is required you must notify your supervisor, department chair, or dean," he said. "What if the person involved *is* the dean?"

"If the person who is involved is a dean, you should go straight to the provost," the lawyer replied. "And we will let the deans that are here know that," she added, prompting scattered laughs from the crowd. She resumed her talk, but before long Phillips was at her again. "So suppose Ed were a dean and Melissa was a senior faculty member who was married to another senior faculty member," he began. "Ed was involved in a relationship with Melissa. Ed would have to recuse himself from making decisions about both Melissa *and* her husband?"

"That would probably pose a real problem," the lawyer replied. "Do you know something I don't know?" she asked playfully.

He might, Phillips replied. "Don't out him or her here!" the lawyer exclaimed. There was more laughter.

"And your expectation would be that the provost or the general counsel, if something like this were to happen, Stanford would be concerned?" Phillips pressed.

"Yes," the lawyer said. "And you and I need to talk outside!" More laughs still.

Phillips assured the Stanford lawyer he was "speaking hypothetically." Only he wasn't. By the time of the seminar, the dean of the business school, Garth Saloner, had been involved with Phillips's estranged wife, Deborah Gruenfeld, a social psychologist and professor of organizational behavior there, for more than a year. And while Saloner had ostensibly removed himself from all decisions involving either Phillips or Gruenfeld, Phillips believed Saloner had remained enmeshed in his affairs, penalizing him

professionally and injecting himself into his divorce and custody battles, all to drive him out of Stanford.

Some of this was not just conjecture. For three months in the summer and fall of 2012, as the incipient romance between Saloner and Gruenfeld developed, Phills, either sitting at his home computer or manning one of his other electronic devices—including, in one key instance, playing with the cell phone his wife had asked him to fix—had monitored and preserved the e-mails, text messages, and Facebook chats between the two. He'd followed their first walk together, and their first drinks, and their first date, and their first intimacies, real and cyber, fumbled and consummated. And all of this unfolded as he believed the Stanford Graduate School of Business (G.S.B.) was slowly squeezing him out, denying him crucial and lucrative teaching assignments and, by calling for a \$250,000 loan to be repaid within less than a year, attempting to force him out of his house on the Stanford campus.

He knew that Saloner had disclosed the fledgling relationship to one of the main authors of the university's harassment policy, Provost John Etchemendy, as the regulations had required, but doubted whether the dean had done so in a timely fashion or had been fully candid with him when he did. And he knew, at least from what Saloner had had to say about it, how seemingly blasé Etchemendy had been about Saloner's disclosure. Phills had also come to believe that, with Saloner, the co-author of a textbook on strategy, now egging her on, the normally diffident and indecisive Gruenfeld had suddenly grown more aggressive, even ruthless, in their ongoing divorce and custody disputes.

"You are being too rational and generous," Saloner—sometimes posing as "Jeni Gee" on Facebook—had counseled her at one point. "Spewing the anger that you feel, even if it is unrelated to what you want, would make you a less predictable and rational adversary." Telling Phills what she *really* thought of him, he advised, would "push him back like a right to the jaw." At regular intervals, he bucked her up. "You are awesome," he told her. "You are the victim here. Roar!" Or "You're a star! Way to totally act w power.... Can you drive this process home now while you have momentum?"

Phills says that his monitoring wasn't hacking but simple self-protection. He had had to decide whether to stay at Apple University, the company's training school in Cupertino, where he'd been working while on a short leave from Stanford, or return to the G.S.B. And whether or just how much his boss, motivated by his ardor for Phills's wife, had it in for him surely mattered. Phills, in fact, denies he stole or hacked anything: he and his wife always shared equipment and passwords. Indeed, the technophobic Gruenfeld continued to use Phills as her personal Genius Bar even after she'd taken up with Saloner. (In her deposition, Gruenfeld denied sharing her passwords with Phills.) Only too late did she realize how much more difficult it has become these days to disentangle from someone electronically than emotionally. "I had e-mails to worry about," Gruenfeld testified this past June. "I had Facebook to worry about. I had Gchat to worry about. I had iMessages to worry about. And there were texts . . . I didn't know how to unhook myself." Earlier, in a text exchange later produced under court order, she and Saloner had chatted about the problem.

Gruenfeld: I am sorry I did not change my facebook [sic] password when we started dating. Never occurred to me that Jim would go there.... My denial was profound.

Saloner: Only a truly awful human being, the lowest of the low, would snoop on private conversations and then use them as blackmail.... The depravity and lack of conscience is [sic] unbelievable.

For Saloner, that was mild. At other times in his chats with Gruenfeld he referred to Phills as an “asshole,” a “sociopath,” and a “dick.” To him and Gruenfeld and Stanford, Phills’s monitoring was a gross and unjustified invasion of privacy. The dean and the university have filed a counterclaim against Phills over it, which has been appended to the lawsuit Phills filed against Saloner and Stanford for unspecified monetary damages for discrimination based on race, gender, and marital status, as well as for wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress, on April 2, 2014—the day before Stanford fired him.

Mutually Assured Destruction

Phills’s head, it has turned out, was not the biggest one to roll. This September, after Poets & Quants, a Web site specializing in business-school news and gossip, prepared to post a story on the case, Saloner abruptly announced his decision to step down as head of what *U.S. News & World Report* ranks as the top business school in the country.

The shocking move came only a year after Etchemendy had re-appointed Saloner, the G.S.B.’s dean since 2009, to a second five-year term. (Gruenfeld had sat on the search committee that originally recommended him.) The provost re-upped him despite a petition signed by 46 former and current administrators and staffers at the school complaining that Saloner led by “personal agendas, favoritism and fear.”

In his resignation statement, Saloner—who’d long coveted the business-school post, which might well have served him as a springboard to the soon-to-be-vacated Stanford presidency—insisted he’d done nothing wrong. Even so, he did not want “a baseless and protracted lawsuit related to a contentious divorce” to distract from the business school’s business. (As things now stand, he will remain dean until the end of the school year.)

By any standards, *Phills v. The Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. University and Garth Saloner* is a colossal mismatch, pitting the infinite resources of a mighty institution against a lone individual who, though at the G.S.B. for 15 years, was never a tenured superstar with an endowed chair like his wife. Legally, his case seems tenuous—“a lawyer in search of a theory” is how one of Stanford’s lawyers dismissively described it. Much of it is based on assumptions rather than facts. Saloner is a man who was known for playing rough and for playing favorites. (“He has a lot of the same qualities as Carly Fiorina,” one G.S.B. professor told me. “He loves you as long as you agree with him, and if you don’t, you’re toast.”) Phills alleges in court papers that he has been “maligned and marginalized,” and harmed “financially and emotionally” by Saloner. Still, anyone making more than a million dollars a

year at Apple, as Phills now does, will be hard-pressed to prove damages or elicit much sympathy from a jury. Phills's friends have implored him to drop the lawsuit and get on with his life. Though he's brought down a dean, his action could cost him his job at the famously press-shy Apple. Stanford will bleed him dry, they warn, then crush him.

But Phills, a former Harvard wrestler good enough to make the 1984 Canadian Olympic team as an alternate (he grew up in Montreal), says that winning, at least by conventional terms, is quite secondary to him. So is money: he already had legal fees approaching half a million dollars. (His divorce and the case against Stanford have required the services of eight attorneys thus far.) His principal objective was never the dean's scalp, he says, but to expose the hypocrisy, dishonesty, cronyism, and bad character at a place charged with imparting ethical leadership to the next generation of moguls.

Thanks in large part to its proximity to Silicon Valley, the G.S.B. has become the most selective, prestigious, and sexy business school in the U.S. Its only real rival is stolid Harvard (which has nearly twice as many students). But no school, even one admitting a tiny percentage of its applicants, is untouchable. More than some of its competitors, the G.S.B. depends on donations from alums, who can always deposit their dollars elsewhere. And like any elite institution, it is particularly susceptible to embarrassment, especially to charges of poor leadership and mismanagement of its own affairs. Saloner won the deanship in part by revamping the G.S.B.'s curriculum, but the revised course offerings clearly did not include Judgment 101 or Introduction to Crisis Management.

Yet Stanford says it's serious about discouraging sexual harassment—its regulations on the subject fill seven single-spaced pages—and Saloner himself said it would not be tolerated on his watch. “Are we doing everything we can to build a culture of mutual respect, a culture in which we behave in private in such a way that we will not be ashamed if our actions come into the public eye?” he has asked. “That training [on sexual harassment] is crystal-clear about our obligations,” says Charles O'Reilly III, who teaches leadership and organizational behavior at the business school. “And if the dean doesn't comply, what's the signal to the rest of us?” Some of Saloner's faculty colleagues predict that, given the likely emergence of additional embarrassments, he won't survive the academic year as dean.

Further fueling the 55-year-old Phills, a polite yet physically imposing man (an Ivy League wrestling opponent, who also boxed, once told him that, of all his adversaries, only Mike Tyson had intimidated him as much), is skin color. For the first time in his life, says Phills, who was one of the rare black professors at the business school when he arrived (and still rare, plus two or three, including Condoleezza Rice, when he left), he has felt the sting of racism, and at allegedly liberal Stanford, where bigotry seems bleached away by the perpetual California sunshine. At various points in their chats, Saloner—a Jew who fled apartheid South Africa rather than serve in its military—and Gruenfeld spoke of putting Phills in a cage and castrating him in public. Saloner relished seeing him in an orange jumpsuit in prison, and compared him to an elephant seal and a tarantula. To punish him and gain custody of their two mixed-race children, Phills charges, Gruenfeld reduced him—a man with three Harvard degrees, including a Ph.D. in organizational behavior—to the quintessential “angry black man.” He calls the experience his “O.J.-ification.”



Clockwise from top left, from Cinesmith.net/Encore.org, by Nancy Rothstein, Linda A. Cicero/Stanford News Service, Toni Gauthier/*San Francisco Chronicle*/Polaris.

Phillis is obsessed with the lawsuit, he admits, and paranoid too. But he maintains he has a case if only 30 percent of what he believes happened actually did. He is clearly not the textbook “rational actor” they study in business schools. As such, he is easily underestimated. “I don’t back down,” he says. “I don’t like bullies. It’s not about money; they could offer to write me a big check right now and I would say no. I’ll be able to look myself in the mirror and have my kids look at me.”

For Gruenfeld—who has been cited by Malcolm Gladwell; who tutored Sheryl Sandberg on gender issues (and sits on the board of Lean In, the nonprofit foundation connected to Sandberg’s best-selling

book of the same name); and who sold her own book, *Acting with Power*, at auction last fall for nearly a million dollars—questions of credibility are equally crucial. How does it look for someone who built her career analyzing the abusiveness (she dubbed it “disinhibition”) of the powerful, and who, until a month before she became romantically entangled with the dean, was the G.S.B.’s sexual-harassment adviser, and who, as co-director of Stanford’s Executive Program for Women Leaders, counsels high-powered women on how to overcome gender stereotypes, to wind up secretly sleeping with her boss?

Once, Phillips says, he’d have happily settled the case: all he’d have wanted would be to stay in the house in which his two children were raised and teach at Stanford for a few more years before becoming emeritus, and for the university to pay his then modest legal fees. But as Stanford dug in, the costs, and the bitterness, and the indignities, have escalated. Phillips assumes that Stanford has gone through all of his university e-mail for the past several years. (Stanford says it has reviewed only those e-mails produced in litigation.) Gruenfeld has seen an investigator for Stanford probe her love life, including whether she ever had affairs with her students. (She did not.) Gruenfeld has accused Phillips of drinking excessively. Phillips says that Gruenfeld confessed to him that she fudged research on the paper that launched her career, and charges that, in the two years since learning about it, Stanford has looked the other way. At a certain point, Gruenfeld, fearful that Phillips would shoot her, had an armed guard stationed outside her classroom.

For a long time, Saloner exuded confidence: to him, Phillips’s quixotic crusade was nothing more than a nuisance. “Everything [is] going to go your/our way because we are on the right side and hold all the cards that count,” he reassured Gruenfeld in one of their chats. So unperturbed was he about any lawsuit Phillips might bring that he taunted the as yet unidentified lawyer representing Phillips who’d be forced to sift through all their chats for anything incriminating. “Well, whoever you are, I apologize in advance :) ,” he wrote in one exchange. (Not everyone thought it such a sure thing. Shortly after Phillips filed his case, in 2014, he says two Stanford professors who have taught leadership, Jeffrey Pfeffer and Robert Sutton, allegedly made a small wager—the stakes: dinner at a fancy San Francisco restaurant—over whether Saloner would last another year in his post.)

Now the case has tarnished everyone involved, including Stanford itself. The money-raisers, one former administrator told me, are in “panic mode.”

“What a mess,” one G.S.B. professor lamented to me. “You know the phrase ‘mutually assured destruction’?” asked another. “This is what we got.”

Star and Spouse

But juicy as the case is, for more than two years most professors, and staffers, and alumni, and trustees, and students, knew next to nothing about it.

Partly it’s because Saloner and Gruenfeld still won’t talk about it, and, until he spoke to me, neither would Phillips. Partly it’s because the G.S.B. is an astonishingly atomized, antisocial place, more a loose confederation of independent contractors than a community. As long as he or she funds their projects and leaves them alone, the dean is quite immaterial to them. (Since Saloner took the job, the G.S.B. has

raised more than \$500 million.) Saloner clearly knew as much; recounting to Gruenfeld how he'd just asked Phil Knight—the Nike co-founder and a G.S.B. alum, who helped bankroll its new campus with a \$105 million gift—to speak at commencement, he texted, “We r developing a great relationship. So so good. That’s my job really.”

Partly it’s because the students, their futures guaranteed simply by having gotten into the place, aren’t engaged enough even to gossip. Their seeming insouciance may account for the intermittent scandals, such as the Stanford business student charged with vehicular manslaughter and felony drunk driving after crashing into a taxi and killing a passenger not long ago, or regular weekend bacchanals in Las Vegas. Partly it’s the press: there’s not much left of it in the Bay Area, and *The Stanford Daily* has proved supine: “Not quite the [*Harvard*] *Crimson*, which would have printed this story gleefully years ago,” a former business-school student, one of the few to learn about and follow the Phills case, complained on her blog. Partly it’s the reluctance to challenge conventional wisdom: since everyone connected to so hot a place looks good, no one wants to take it down. And partly it’s fear. Everyone wants to work at Stanford, or to keep working there, or to send a child there, or to find a job in a place run by its ubiquitous alums, who include Mary Barra, the C.E.O. of General Motors, Jeff Skoll and John Donahoe of eBay, and Laurene Powell Jobs, widow of Steve and a powerhouse in the world of philanthropy.

In court papers, Stanford argues that it bent over backward to keep Phills, extending his leave multiple times (asked in his deposition to explain one such extension, Etchemendy said, “I’m just a nice guy. What can I say?”), and that, as “annoying” as Gruenfeld’s romance with the dean may have been to him, it did not create a “hostile work environment.” In fact, the university contends that Phills never really wanted to return to campus and is simply out for revenge and money. “At its core, this is an angry husband who is angry at his estranged wife, in a messy divorce that’s gone on and on, and he seems intent upon using whatever he can to hurt her and now Garth,” said Michael T. Lucey, of Gordon & Rees, the San Francisco law firm representing Stanford and Saloner in the case. (Gruenfeld is a party only in the separate divorce action.)

Stanford’s lawyers say the dean excused himself from any decisions involving Phills before he and Gruenfeld shared their first kiss. And that the decision to recall the loan on the house the couple shared prior to their separation was a “no-brainer” made by apparatchiks in Stanford’s housing office rather than Saloner’s nefarious attempt at eviction. Such loans, they say, are made only to entice or retain elite professors such as Gruenfeld, who might otherwise be put off by insane real-estate prices in the area, and were never intended for add-ons such as Phills—“trailing spouses,” in academic lingo, meaning the satellites of the university’s stars.

And Gruenfeld is a star. At a G.S.B. road show in New York last December, I got to see the professor give her “Acting with Power” speech—the same kind of speech for which she earns, at Facebook or Genentech or eBay or PayPal, \$25,000 a pop, according to Phills, who handled the family finances. It distills her two decades’ worth of research on power—an interest, as she explains in her presentation, sparked by her own lifelong feelings of powerlessness—along with her more recent collaboration with actors in Stanford’s drama department.

People assess trustworthiness, she'll tell you, in a tenth of a second. What they decide depends far less on what you say (7 percent) than on how you carry yourself (the other 93). At times one must be consciously contemptuous of others—i.e., reach for your cell phone while someone's talking—just to show who's boss. Lifting your chin and looking out of the bottom of your eyes (which also “pulls down the corners of the mouth, effectively removing the smile”) can have “amazing” results. If substance is overrated, so is authenticity: “Just be yourself” is “terrible advice.”

It's simple: lots of it you already know, or would if you thought very much about it. And unthreatening, requiring no great psychic overhauls. Last year *Crown Business*, part of Penguin Random House, agreed to pay Gruenfeld \$900,000 to turn it into a book, slated to be published in the fall of 2017. She will earn an additional \$198,000 from foreign sales: readers in the Netherlands, Japan, Korea, China, and Taiwan, eager to imbibe state-of-the-art American self-salesmanship, will get editions of their own.

Gruenfeld earned her doctorate in psychology at the University of Illinois in 1993. Her dissertation, on decision-making in the United States Supreme Court, won all sorts of prestigious awards and helped land her a teaching job at Northwestern. That same year, she met Phills, then teaching at Yale, but the two did not start dating for several years, and, fearful it might cloud her prospects, she refused to make their engagement public until, as she put it, a tenured post was “in the bag.” (According to Phills, she would remove her engagement ring every morning before going to work.) They married in September 1999. The next year the two officially joined the Stanford faculty. While Gruenfeld was tenured, Phills was imprisoned between a pair of parentheses: his job description—“professor (teaching)” —meant he would never get tenure, though he says that with continuing appointments he felt he had almost the same thing.

With the help of supplementary loans, the two gutted and rebuilt a home on the Stanford campus. By the time they'd moved back into it, in 2005, Phills was an associate professor (teaching)—capable, he contends, of assuming the extraordinary loans himself if Gruenfeld were ever to move out. Courting the pair, Yale invited Gruenfeld and Phills to visit for a year in New Haven. But before that could happen, the younger of their two daughters, not yet two, was diagnosed with cancer. Her treatment, which was ultimately successful, kept the couple at Stanford.

But it put further strains on what was becoming a shaky marriage, which they discussed in 2010 in workshops run by the Handel Group, an executive- and life-coaching company. Asked to list her “hauntings” for one such program—and ignoring the advice of a friend that such confessionals were “just crazy”—Gruenfeld wrote, “I once fudged the data for an important research project. The paper is published. I will go to my grave with that one.” Phills says Gruenfeld told him shortly afterward that the paper in question was her award-winning dissertation. Gruenfeld says in her deposition that she does not remember writing or saying any such thing, and that in any case it's not true. Margaret Neale, a G.S.B. professor who has co-authored articles with Gruenfeld and had been a mentor to her at both Northwestern and Stanford, said “her scholarly integrity and courage are unassailable” and called any suggestions of data manipulation “impossible.”

By early 2012, after two years of counseling, Phills and Gruenfeld—he feeling unsupported and neglected professionally, she feeling unsupported and neglected in child rearing—were heading toward divorce. In June, Gruenfeld moved out. Phills was now teaching at Apple University. Thanks to prior leaves, he had until the end of November to decide whether to stay there or return to Stanford. He says it posed a tough choice: Apple paid far better and was more exciting, while Stanford was more secure and cushy. And then there was the house, in which he could remain, he hoped, as long as he was affiliated with the university and had that crucial loan.

“We R Nuts”

Gruenfeld and Saloner, whose wife had long suffered from cancer, had bonded several years earlier over the illnesses in their respective families. At one point in 2008 or 2009, according to Phills, they’d shared a “moment” in Saloner’s office emotionally intimate enough for Gruenfeld to have told him about it afterward. (Phills acknowledges having had a brief affair early in their marriage.) At an engagement party for one of Saloner’s daughters in March 2012, Phills thought Gruenfeld and the dean had spent an awfully long time talking. That June, Saloner’s wife died. Two weeks later the dean, who’d learned that Gruenfeld and Phills had separated, e-mailed her, he later said, to congratulate her on her wildly popular “Acting with Power” class. “It is so wonderful to see you find your thing and blossom,” he told her in one of the first e-mails Phills intercepted. “I hope you are doing OK—I am thinking of you.” (It wasn’t flirting, Saloner later testified; he regularly reached out to faculty members in distress. He was asked if he had also comforted Phills. “I did not,” he replied.) Gruenfeld thanked him, and invited him to her yoga class. “Absolutely!” he replied.

In August, Saloner invited Gruenfeld for a walk in a nearby nature preserve, one, coincidentally or not, further removed from the Stanford campus than the more popular hiking paths around the satellite dish in the Stanford foothills. “9AM Hike Arastradero,” she wrote on the Google calendar she and Phills still shared. “PS because I’m now curious, who did you go hiking with?” Phills wrote her that night. She did not reply. He did not yet suspect Saloner, but would not have approved: he did not like the man—he didn’t think he was “nice”—and, besides, Saloner had eviscerated the social-innovation center, a do-good place with scant constituency in a school dedicated to bottom lines, which had grown substantially under Phills’s leadership, and had canceled two very popular executive-education programs he’d designed and run. Two years later, both programs were reinstated, without Phills. Some of his friends speculate that Phills’s growing marginality at the G.S.B. made him less appealing to Gruenfeld and Saloner both. For obvious reasons, Saloner—who once told Gruenfeld he was a “possessive type”—was uncomfortable having Phills around.

Sometime that summer, Phills’s younger daughter, now eight, told her father how “Garth” had just visited with her mother, and how friendly he had been. That fall, in the ongoing pre-divorce mediation, Gruenfeld seemed to be digging in. Phills, suspecting that Saloner was doing some coaching, and that his wife was bad-mouthing him to his boss (and that some of his colleagues had become standoffish), began his surveillance. Technically it was easy, Phills says—Gruenfeld’s passwords were stored in his computer and iPad—but morally it was more dicey, and he sought out advice from both the university

“ombuds” and its dean for religious life. As relevant tidbits turned up, and he grew more alarmed, the frequency of his reconnaissance increased. Though Saloner and Gruenfeld vowed to each other to delete their conversations immediately, in some instances Phills was too quick for them, capturing the exchanges with screen shots.

In mid-to-late October, Saloner and Gruenfeld saw each other several times. What ensued would normally be of only voyeuristic interest but for the issue of recusal, which became obligatory at Stanford once a “consensual sexual or romantic” relationship begins. So it matters that, in the space of 10 days or so, the two scuttled dinner plans upon spotting some G.S.B. colleagues in a Palo Alto restaurant, and ended up at Saloner’s house; that Saloner proposed going to a movie in another county, where they could hold hands undetected; that Saloner grew “dizzy” while embracing Gruenfeld in his kitchen; that, before reluctantly parting ways on another evening, they groped each other at her house. (Despite all these facts, contained in intercepted chats, Stanford continues to insist they had yet to kiss—that, defying the rules of both flirtation and baseball, the dean had somehow approached second base without ever touching first.)

That his estranged wife was seeing someone didn’t much concern him, Phills says; he’d begun dating an environmental biologist. But decisions on the loans and his teaching load were pending, and though he assumed Saloner would be too smart—too *strategic*—to leave any traces, he suspected the dean was weighing in. Finally, on October 28, 2012, Phills wrote Etchemendy, Stanford’s longest-serving provost, to express his concerns. He explained that further complicating the difficult career choice he now faced was what he called “some very sensitive personal issues” involving “the dean’s office at the GSB.” Etchemendy, with whom Phills had always enjoyed a cordial relationship, agreed to see Phills the following Friday, November 2.

But before that could happen, on Halloween morning, Saloner also wrote Etchemendy, to say that Gruenfeld and Phills had separated and that he’d “seen Deb a few times socially.” Though it was unclear where things were heading, he went on, he was letting the provost know about it, both out of “an abundance of caution” and because the situation was “so fraught.” No decisions regarding Gruenfeld loomed, he explained, but questions concerning Phills did; could Saloner still weigh in on them? “Obviously we are being as discreet as we can,” he added. “I’d like to spare her the rumor mill if I can.”

In fact, as their chats make clear, that very secrecy had become an aphrodisiac. When would someone looking up at the windows of the G.S.B. figure out they were texting each other? What would her colleagues on the deanship search committee make of how things had turned out, and whether she had a personal interest? Could they look at each other during meetings and keep a straight face? And when should they go public? Attending a Springsteen concert together in Oakland might be “too dangerous,” but could they go out in New York “without being scared shitless?” (Once, he typed her texts from Etchemendy’s waiting room. “We r nuts,” he admitted.)

“I had heard some noise about this,” Etchemendy replied to Saloner, referring to Phills’s cryptic message. “I’m absolutely supportive of anything you decide wrt [with regard to] Jim. I’d be very sorry

to lose Deb.” Etchemendy concedes it was a “non-sequitur”; Gruenfeld wasn’t going anywhere. And if Saloner’s continued desire to “weigh in” on matters regarding Phills didn’t sound much like recusal, neither did Etchemendy’s support for “anything you decide.” Etchemendy seems to have taken Saloner at his word: the relationship remained, as the provost added, “fairly cursory” and “nascent.” Had they entered the realm of the romantic or the sexual, Etchemendy added, everything would be very different.

The dean quickly shared the good news with Gruenfeld. The provost, he told her, was “totally cool.”

Saloner: He basically ignored what I said about the two of us and, not in these words, that he trusts me to make any decisions regarding Jim. That is his style. It is almost as though he pretends he hasn’t heard, although of course he has. I think it is his way of saying “you have done what the policy says you have to do, I appreciate it, but the policy wasn’t written with you/this in mind and so I’m respecting your privacy and ignoring it.”

Gruenfeld: Love that. So discreet and respectful.

Saloner: It is a non-issue for him.

That Saloner may not have leveled with the provost, and had understated the relationship, was further apparent from fragments of their conversation that same day. “You make me feel safe and it is such a gift,” she told him in the morning. That night, he urged caution when she proposed “sneaking out”: they probably could not limit themselves to a hug, he warned. “I want to hold you,” Saloner told her a few minutes later. “I want you to hold me,” she replied.

Phills says he had already concluded that telling the provost what was going on would only inflame things, and had canceled his appointment. Now, from reading the exchange between the dean and his wife, he says he believed that Saloner and Etchemendy were in league, making any meeting with the provost pointless. Replying by e-mail, Etchemendy wished Phills well and said nothing of what Saloner had told him.

During one of their periodic family dinners, a couple of weeks later, Phills says, Gruenfeld asked him to clean up her sluggish cell phone. Buried in its trash bin he found a 17-page marathon chat between his wife in Palo Alto and Saloner in Dubai from November 4, five days after Saloner’s note to Etchemendy, one so graphic and salacious that before producing it in court Phills’s own lawyers redacted it. Of far greater relevance to Phills than what the two imagined doing to each other was what they had actually done on the eve of Saloner’s departure two nights earlier. “What an amazing night. What an incredible gift,” Saloner wrote, in an exchange that also had them discussing what kind of birth control to use going forward. Clearly, the relationship had gone beyond “nascent,” but Saloner never said so to the provost. “It would have been better had Garth let me know that the relationship had progressed to the next stage when it did,” Etchemendy says.

School for Scandal

Four days after that long chat, senior associate dean for academic affairs Madhav V. Rajan, who like everyone else in the G.S.B. brass still knew nothing about the dean's romance, contacted Saloner in India about Phills's request to assume the loans. The "unanimous sentiment," Rajan wrote, was to turn Phills down, but did Saloner concur? "I agree with the view of the SADs on this," replied Saloner, who, whether or not he had weighed in earlier, would normally have had the final word at the G.S.B. on such a question. He blind-copied the provost. Rajan gave Phills the bad news. The decision represented "the collective opinion of everyone in the dean's office," Rajan told Phills. "Everyone" included Saloner.

Phills's November 30 deadline for deciding whether to return from Apple approached. The day before, Gruenfeld and Saloner chatted about it.

Gruenfeld: Maybe he's staying at apple.

Saloner: Let's hope. We deserve something good tomorrow. We've earned it. . . . the universe owes us. Big time.

But Phills decided not to decide. In a letter to Etchemendy, copied to Stanford general counsel Debra Zumwalt, he said he would neither resign nor return. (A few months later he laid out his terms: the loans had to be extended and guarantees be provided that he would report to someone beyond Saloner's control.) He then called Gruenfeld to tell her he knew about the affair. Only then, she later testified, did she realize he'd been "spying" on her. Later that day, he texted her to say he was "not feeling anything big emotionally" and that he hoped "we can work things out so that nobody gets harmed more than has already happened . . . That includes Garth and his family as well as ours." He added, "So I am hoping you don't do anything rash that would escalate the situation." With litigation looming, he asked Etchemendy that all relevant records—i.e., communications between his wife and the dean—be preserved. But word reached Saloner only after he'd destroyed at least the Facebook postings.

Etchemendy was puzzled by Phills's concerns; in incestuous academia, estranged spouses co-existed all the time. But henceforth, Etchemendy told Saloner, he'd officially handle everything involving Phills, effectively recusing the dean. He directed Saloner to tell Rajan to lengthen Phills's leave by four months to help the university "sort things out," the first of several such extensions spanning more than a year, during which Phills continued to teach at Stanford, sometimes without pay. Shortly before they were to go to the 2013 Rose Bowl together, Saloner and Gruenfeld went public.

Meanwhile, according to her deposition, Gruenfeld had construed some of Phills's statements, like about being careful or not escalating things, not as pleas but as threats. His prodding her to fill out certain life-insurance forms—he was replacing the Stanford policy with one from Apple—seemed menacing to her, in a *Double Indemnity* kind of way.

In early March 2013, three months after Phills had filed for divorce, he and Gruenfeld had an argument in the driveway of his home. Gruenfeld promptly drove off to Saloner's house, and the two then went to the Stanford police, where Gruenfeld asked for an emergency protective order. It was denied, but a

couple of days later, she asked for a restraining order. To stress the peril she was in, she noted that Phills had been a wrestler; that he had been arrested as a teenager; that he owned three guns; and that, during another driveway altercation, he had “reeked of alcohol.” Phills was not informed of the restraining-order request, and was given no chance to respond. She got the order, effective for six months. Henceforth, Phills had to stay 50 yards away from her (tricky, because they worked in the same building) and notify her a day in advance when planning to be on campus (less tricky, because they shared an assistant). Since the original version of the restraining order forbade Phills from being on campus without such notice, and his house was on campus, he arguably violated it even when he was at home. Gruenfeld was also awarded primary custody: aside from Tuesday nights, Phills could now see his daughters only every other weekend.

Though one of Gruenfeld’s friends told me Phills was “an extremely scary person,” this is very much a minority view. If he resembles a Tyson, it’s far more Neil deGrasse (a friend and teammate with whom he periodically wrestled at Harvard) than Mike. Questioned by the police, neither Gruenfeld nor her daughters could cite any time he had ever lifted a hand against her; in fact, what the younger daughter told the police had most frightened her that day in the driveway was that her mother might “roll over my dad’s toes.” Yes, Phills had been arrested once as a minor, in the course of rescuing his younger sister from a sexual assault, but he’d never been charged with anything. Yes, he had guns, but he’d used them only four or five times—for skeet shooting. Yes, he drank, but he was “vigilant”: his father had died of liver disease. His championship wrestling days were long over, and, as he told the family-court judge, he’d become “a largely sedentary and overweight academic.”

Desperate to regain co-custody of his children—and to dent Gruenfeld’s credibility—Phills pulled out her apparent admission about fudging research and gave it to both the G.S.B. and the court-appointed custody evaluator. He says he remained convinced that without Saloner’s encouragement—“poke a stick at him every day,” the dean had advised Gruenfeld at one point—none of this would be happening. Though it took a year, co-custody was eventually restored.

Shortly after Saloner’s resignation in September, one of his loyalists at the G.S.B. expressed fear to me about the dean’s well-being. Long ago, he explained, Saloner had opted for administration over scholarship, and now all that was gone. “This is going to destroy him,” he warned. “I don’t quite know how he recovers from this.”

Since then, though, Saloner appears to have regrouped, and, like Phills, has even hired his own publicist and may soon hire a lawyer. Yet with the heat from the case now likely to shift to Etchemendy, the question is whether the provost, too, might turn on Saloner. Some of the dean’s colleagues believe his insistence on staying at the school, and Stanford’s willingness to let him, is but the latest in a long list of maladroit moves and miscalculations. One G.S.B. professor predicted that, among students, Saloner will become an object of ridicule, and that the castration he spoke of in one chat—“Knife. Penis. Public Square,” he’d texted Gruenfeld, apparently referencing the erotic Japanese art film *In the Realm of the Senses*—will surely be reprised as a campus catchphrase. He also predicted that Saloner will be tapping into his extensive Silicon Valley ties to find himself a job there.

As for Phills, he says Saloner's resignation surprised and saddened him: "It was completely avoidable, if the university had done the right thing." Meanwhile, his lawsuit plods on. Phills says he remains convinced that, if they can be retrieved, whether from their equipment or from the servers, the lost electronic exchanges between Saloner and Gruenfeld (which the court has ordered that they produce) will finally reveal the extent of Saloner's inappropriate involvement in his professional and personal affairs. Settlement talks have gotten nowhere. If the case does get to trial, it probably won't be before next April or May. Noting the complicated financial issues (including the status of the house), Phills put the chances that he and Gruenfeld will still be officially married a year from now at 90 percent.

When Phills packed up his Stanford office, this past July, some colleagues were surprised: they hadn't even known he'd been sacked. For now, he is a nonperson at Stanford, still in the house (the university is no longer pressing him to repay the loans) but required to sell it by June 2017, and so unsure whether he'd be admitted to the school's libraries and gyms that he hasn't even tried. (Stanford says he is entitled to a "courtesy" ID card, but that he would have to apply for one through Gruenfeld.)

Recently, though, there was a friendly communiqué from the university. That academic ritual at Stanford had come back around: time, once again, for sexual-harassment training.

THE STANFORD UNIVERSITY SEX ABUSE AND ARROGANCE GROOMING CLUBS

- How the tech CEO's of Silicon Valley turned into scumbags and the Co-eds got prostituted
- A dynastic and covert sociological conditioning system still ruins student development

By Susan Connors

They were supposed to sell Christmas tree's and help little old ladies cross the street. Instead, the male graduates of Stanford University have turned into rapists, sex abusers and the largest producers of political bribes in American history. What went wrong?

The grooming guides and facade pitch of the Stanford social clubs, or "socials" as they are known, is that they are "*oriented towards promoting social service by hosting certain community-based welfare functions*". This pitch is designed to appeal to the naive, young, bright-eyed, bushy-tailed children that have just arrived at college with hopes of "*changing the world*". It is a **sucker-play** designed by Yale, Stanford and Harvard globalist bosses in order to steer the herd of fresh meat.

The Key Club and *The Guardsmen* men's club at Stanford University exist to create cookie-cutter clones and create a private male club of square-jawed insiders who are supplied with "baby-ovens" by the associated female supply-chain of *The Junior League* and *The Spinsters* women's clubs.

Woke students say: "They're useless clubs out there for jackass tools to join in order to pad their resume. "*Look, I'm in Key Club and Guardsmen! I'm a good person! Got a kickass club shirt on me, too!*" If you wear those shirts then, seriously, you must suck so bad that you need them to make yourself look good."

They were originally simply available for the sake of resume fluff. Both organizations say they have "*beneficial intentions and provide many outstanding and charitable activities for active participation from the school and surrounding community (i.e. obtain funds for charity, promote social involvement, build mutual goodwill, support joint collaboration, encourage concern for the general welfare, and so forth).* Many students invest their sincerest efforts into them and feel that that they should be highly respected..." It is all a load of crap, though, designed to create exclusive control for rich globalist families and dynastic clusters of old family titles.

The "socials" of Stanford are brain-washing classes designed to create the next generation of dynastic family members to keep the mansions well stocked with yuppie Whole Foods-buying robots.

These clubs work on a school to school level but have a covert system of governance from past 'club officers'. Key Club International is an international organization composed of 33 districts (California-Nevada-Hawaii being one, for example), and within each district are many divisions (61 or so in CNH), and in each division, up to 15 schools that all conspire on ideology via email, newsletters and "mentors".

Key Clubs communicate with each other, develop ideas on service, and correspond on service projects with a concentrated elitist focus. In short, Key Clubs from California and Key Clubs from Massachusetts both work on a single political service initiative, concentrating service and making a political difference in one area for the DNC. With governance, there are also many leadership positions. Running a successful club, division, district, or international organization takes a lot of work, and it's a great leadership experience for future Obamas. This helps spread a synchronized political agenda across the nation covertly guided by the parents and administrators of a common ideology. Often the groups are promoting a non-profit Dark Money campaign financing PAC as seen in the feature film: DARK MONEY.

To get in to a "social" you will need to have facially symmetrical facial features. You will need to dress like you just walked out of a **Lands End** catalog. You will need to use exaggerated facial expressions to respond to everything that is said to you and never, **ever**, nasalize a vowel. You will need to smile with your teeth together and you will need a good nose job.

Socials increase exclusivity bonding for members which makes service more of an obligation. Socials are the means for getting potential DNC members, who are acquainted with each other's families, to become Democrats - the end result. It is sad, however, that many clubs seem to have lost touch with their original purpose - political exclusivity. The main rule: **You must only do business and politics with other members and not go outside the designated yuppie sphere!**

Regarding the religious status of Key Club, although there are passing references to religion, such as in the pledge (I pledge on my honor to...build my home, school, and community, to serve my nation and god...), atheists and agnostics will have no problem getting leadership positions because it is all liberal-biased. The issue of religion is usually brought up during invocations in order to stimulate

psychological Mnemonics and make students feel impassioned. These grooming clubs are of an exclusive nature.

In the last 5 years, China has uncovered this scheme and flooded Stanford with Asian Co-eds in order to try to insert their national policy interests into this 100 year old social programming opportunity. In fact, today, you can't walk down University Avenue in Palo Alto, or Broadway in Burlingame, without finding that every young yuppie guy has a fresh Asian girlfriend clinging to his arm waiting for that IPO.

So what's so honorable about being in an organization that proclaims how honorable you are? **Nothing**, aside from the fancy velvet cape you pay too much for and get when you graduate. If you want to join a community service organization, join Boy Scouts, or any of the other "real" community service organizations.

You do paltry amounts of community service in these clubs while pretending that you actually care. Nobody does anything that causes them to sweat. The most exertion that anyone undertakes is blowing up party balloons. You then list it on your resume as if you actually did something.

Why do you even need to be in a club to do community service?

This is a huge problem among today's youth. Community service should build you up as a person. You should learn from your experiences and develop compassion for the less fortunate. And then you can list it on your resume.

These clubs are absolute jokes that suck the unaware kids into social programming, blind them with candy-coated "SJW floss" and steer them into the roles of Wall Street tools.

Now the members of these clubs have created a "*Fortress of Assholes*" in a series of office buildings on Palo Alto's Sandhill Road. They are, as the news reports, the New Mafia:

"...SILICON VALLEY VC'S & PAYPAL MAFIA TECH OLIGARCHS ARE RAISED TO BE SOCIOPATHS AND EXHIBIT LAWLESS DERANGED SOCIAL ACTIONS LIKE RAPE, SEX ABUSE, MISOGYNY, TAX EVASION, RACISM, BRIBERY, THEFT AND OTHER ILLICIT DEVIANCE.."

This is where the wife-abusing, arrogant slime that run Silicon Valley come from.

Let's look further back at how these Misogyny Havens existed in previous decades:

On a summer evening two years ago, the Washington Club threw a going-away party for itself at Patterson House, its ornate white-marble sugar cake of a mansion on Dupont Circle. Guests sipped cocktails in the massive ballroom before filing into the dining room to eat beef and salmon served on the club's signature pink-and-white china. "Everybody was dressed to the nines and very happy," says Priscilla Baker, former president of the women's club.

In the months that followed, the china was sold off to members who wanted a keepsake. Baker worked with Sloans & Kenyon, the Chevy Chase auction house, to sell off the most valuable antiques—a Qing Dynasty celadon jade vase went for \$16,000, and two gilt-framed mirrors got \$10,000, according to the Washington Post. Many of the office’s file cabinets and desks were donated to political campaigns gearing up for the 2014 elections. Last June, Baker handed over the keys to SB-Urban, which had bought the mansion for a reported \$20 million, with plans to convert it into luxury “micro-apartments.” “The club started in 1891,” says club historian Edith Walter. “It was unique in its time, but time has moved on.”

Our times don’t favor the private clubs that once defined elite society in the nation’s capital: the Cosmos, the Metropolitan, the Army and Navy, the Alibi, the George Town, the University, the National Press Club, the American News Women’s Club, the Economic Club, and others—like the F Street Club, which closed in 1999, and the Federal City Club, shuttered in 2006—that are no more. There are still plenty of clubbable types, but few Washington players today devote hours to the multi-martini lunches that private clubs were designed around—***the kind that risk violating federal ethics regulations.***

Home and work hold more sway over us than they did in the clubs’ midcentury heyday. Those who can leave their desks at the end of the day rush home to spend time with the kids. When we do go out, there’s more cachet in dining at Le Diplomate or the Red Hen.

Amid all this busyness, much of our socializing has moved online or revolves around team activities such as adult kickball leagues that spring up every year in Adams Morgan. Media-versus-Congress softball games can be more useful than stopping by a members-only club.

“Our generation preferred meeting face to face,” says James Robinson, a former Office of Management and Budget employee who belonged to the Federal City Club.

The Washington Club suffered all these problems, but its demise may have had less to do with changing times than competition—chiefly from the Sulgrave, another women’s club across P Street—and mismanagement. The Washington Club’s volunteer board, according to Baker, was never sufficiently diligent about running a tricky combination of nonprofit organization, events venue, and historic-preservation trust. “We had a maid who used to curl up on Charles Lindbergh’s bed”—so called because the aviator had slept there when Calvin Coolidge occupied the mansion—“and take a nap,” says Baker.

Washington’s social clubs have survived periods of crisis before, namely the 1960s, when they struggled over whether to admit African-Americans—attorney general Robert F. Kennedy once boycotted the then whites-only Metropolitan Club—and the ’80s, when male bastions like the Cosmos and the Metropolitan faced the apparently more staggering question of whether to admit women. It may be too early, in other words, to say the game is up for Washington’s private clubs. Facing today’s existential challenges, they’re evolving in ways that would have been unimaginable to their founders.

Originally housed in the old Corcoran Building at 15th and F streets, the Cosmos Club now resides in the Beaux Arts-style Townsend Mansion on Massachusetts Avenue. Since its founding in 1878 by John Wesley Powell and other early members of the National Geographic Society, the Cosmos has prided itself on its intellectual firepower. Members are expected to have published significantly in their field. Walter Lippmann composed a memo to President Woodrow Wilson in the old library, urging him to enter World War I. Novelist Herman Wouk wrote part of *War and Remembrance* in an upstairs bedroom while his Georgetown house was being remodeled. As more than one person told me, the Cosmos is for people with brains, the Metropolitan is for people with money, and the University—or, sometimes, the Army-Navy—is for people with neither.

This august tradition has helped insulate the Cosmos from the slumping numbers that have befallen other clubs. A wall near the lobby displays postage stamps commemorating members; other walls are dedicated to Nobel and Pulitzer winners. “At the Cosmos, it’s like, wow, there’s them and then there’s me,” a member told me, his face alight with reflected glory.

The Cosmos stays true to its founding mission of feeding the political mind with carefully selected propaganda, with regular expert-led panels on topics such as the politics and economics of the late New Deal, clubs for specialized interests like birding and the Civil War, and art exhibits. “It’s quaint, in its way,” another member says, “unlike the other clubs in DC, which are more about who do you know and that kind of thing.”

For their annual dues of about \$2,000, the clubs also offer bygone pleasures: the coat-check girl and doorman know you by name (but “not in any obsequious way,” as one Metropolitan Club member puts it).

The Cosmos has a wood-paneled library, with deep armchairs you can imagine Bertie Wooster sinking into with a cigar and a glitzy gold-and-glass ballroom where it actually holds balls. Members are encouraged to help offset the \$12 million in annual operating costs by renting the common areas for special events or staying overnight in small, well-appointed rooms overlooking the rooftops of Embassy Row.

For all that, the Cosmos was hardly bustling when I visited on a Tuesday for a covert tour. (Like many DC social clubs, the Cosmos, which did not respond to calls and e-mails for this story, discourages members from speaking about the place to the press. It’s like Fight Club.) On the two lower floors, a dining room—leather chairs, white tablecloths—resembled a very nice but somewhat antiseptic hotel restaurant. Up a grand staircase were the ballroom, the library, and several large rooms where coffee urns stood sentry. As my guide and I reached the rambling back halls of the third floor, we were overcome by mischievous glee—in part at the building’s campy seriousness: the “limit five persons” inscription in the elevator, rendered in Latin; another noting the availability of “wireless fidelity” internet.

In the billiards room on the third floor—with old-fashioned wooden bead scorekeepers suspended over the green baize tables—was an artsy nude painting, a relic of the Cosmos’s decades as one of DC’s fanciest man caves. (Women were admitted in 1988.) As my guide and I passed the card room across

the hall, talking a bit too loudly, a group of white-haired ladies looked up from their hands at once, as if their game hadn't been disturbed in years.

Age, as a factor in the decline of private clubs, is a matter of controversy. Clubs have always skewed old. And why not? Retired people have both disposable income and time to volunteer on committees and attend events often held during work hours. The clubs can survive, one side argues, as long as people keep turning 60.

But lately, membership is verging on the Methuselan. When I lunched at the Cosmos on another day, the guests nearest in age had me by easily 20 years. One man who has gone there his entire life told me it was “very stuffy—seriously geriatric” and that it “smells like mothballs.” As the average age rises, of course, the rolls will naturally be depleted faster. Unreplenished membership was a major factor in the closing of the F Street and Federal City clubs as well as the Washington Club. These days, most clubs give reduced rates or initiation fees to applicants who are under 35 or even 45.

The elderly are also, by and large, less influential in Washington than middle-aged senior staffers, who once lured their juniors interested in networking—the reason women and minorities wanted access to “old boys” clubs in the first place.

Ashley Taylor Bronczek is just the sort of woman who might have powered a private club a generation ago. The granddaughter of Kennedy-era power couple Lloyd and Ann Hand, Bronczek runs her own charity and is a fixture at the philanthropic galas that constitute Washington social life today. Private clubs offer little to her ilk. “I don't see a lot of younger under-35s going to the Sulgrave,” she says.

Says Robinson: “Only clubs that cater to what people want—which is country clubs and job networking—are flourishing.”

To fight their growing irrelevancy, some clubs now offer events aimed at forty-to-fiftysomethings to promote networking—as opposed to allowing it simply to flow in proverbial smoke-filled rooms. The City Tavern Club in Georgetown holds a foreign-policy evening designed, says former president Jeffrey Kimbell, “to help younger members expand their social networks.”

Other clubs are focusing on creating a country-club experience. A \$4.4-million renovation at the University Club included a new spa-and-fitness area. Until recently, the Metropolitan employed former George Washington University squash star Omar Sobhy as its pro.

At the Cosmos, the concessions have included not only a one-room “fitness center” but also a relaxation, in summer, of the jacket-and-tie dress code. A room off the entryway is being turned into a casual sitting area where people can check their digital devices without disturbing the inner sanctum.

The changes have reportedly brought stress to some senior members: If you start altering the dress code, they worry, where does the anarchy end? But most have reconciled themselves for the good of the club.

“Anytime you make change, there's anxiety,” said one of my unofficial guides. “But I would say that the Cosmos Club getting more members has been very welcome.”

The club that's done the most in recent years to bring in younger members is the George Town Club. Despite its quaintly bifurcated name and its origins in an 18th-century rowhouse on Wisconsin Avenue, it's a relative newcomer, dreamed up in the mid-1960s by Korean businessman Tongsun Park to attract influential—and influenceable—Washingtonians. In 1976, Park was accused of funneling cash from South Korea's intelligence agency to dozens of members of Congress. More recently, the George Town Club suffered another scandal, in which its accountant embezzled more than \$300,000.

In 2012, desperate to save the club, the board brought in Bo Blair, a restaurateur best known for the nearby yuppie-bro haven Smith Point. Blair, working for free, oversaw a full-scale renovation. He updated the menu and dress code and freshened the waiters' uniforms, removing their old-school white gloves. Lowering dues, he actively campaigned among Georgetown's thirty- and fortysomethings.

At first, Blair says, the process was “like getting people to buy into a sinking ship.” But since the renovations began, says club president Sharon Casey, 160 new members have come on and the club is receiving ten applications a month.

The challenge is to balance fresh blood with selectivity. Liza Tanner, who is director of the annual-giving fund at Bethesda's Landon School and in her thirties, has belonged to the George Town since 2013. She says some members worried that younger members would turn the George Town into a Friday-night bar scene—“Smith Point after dark,” as she puts it.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collegiate_secret_societies_

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<https://nypost.com/2017/07/22/harvard-wants-to-ban-elite-soc...>

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stanfordbachelors.org

['20 minutes of action': father defends **Stanford** student son ...](#)

Brock Turner makes his way into court in Palo Alto, California. Turner was given a six-month jail term after sexually assaulting an unconscious woman. Photograph: Dan Honda/AP The father of a former **Stanford** University athlete convicted on multiple charges of sexual assault has said his son should ...

<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/06/fa>

**RAPISTS &
DOUCHEBAGS
COME FROM
STANFORD
UNIVERSITY**



Driven To Obsession

If You Were Going To Run Stanford Money For Hillary Clinton, You Would Have A Resume Like This...

“The Economic Integration of Hispanics: Evidence from Retail,” with Rebecca Diamond and Francine Lafontaine, ongoing.

“The Rise of Fast Food in Poor and Hispanic Neighborhoods,” with Francine Lafontaine, 2016.

“The Teachers Who Leave: Pulled by Opportunity or Pushed by Accountability?” with Sara Champion, September 2011.

“Teachers’ Pay Compression: Leaving for Opportunity?” with Anna Mastri and Sara Champion, September 2010.

“Connective Capital as Social Capital: The Value of Problem-Solving Networks for Team Players in Firms,” with Casey Ichniowski, NBER working paper #15619, December 2009.

“Insider Econometrics: Empirical Studies of How Management Matters,” NBER Working Paper #15618, December 2009.

“People Management Practices and Productivity,” October 16, 2009.

“What do Bosses Do?” working Paper, September 2009.

“Wage Compression and Teacher Quality,” with Anna Mastri and Sara Champion, January 2008.

“Talent Sorting and Skill Complementarity Among Software Engineers” (with Frederik Andersson, Matthew Freedman, John Haltiwanger, Paul Oyer), January 2007.

“Connective Capital: Building Problem-Solving Networks Within Firms” (with Casey Ichniowski), revised April 2005.

“Technology Shocks and Problem-Solving Capacity,” March 2002.

“Productivity in the New Economy,” (speech) September 2000.

“Innovative Human Resource Practices and Workplace Efficiency,” (speech) July 2000.

“Innovative HRM Practices as a Technology Shock: Building ‘Problem-Solving Capacity’ in Production Workers,” for presentation at conference on Technology, Regulation, and Employment, sponsored by CEMFI, Madrid, June 1999.

“The Evolution Towards High-Involvement Organizations: Distinguishing Differences in Workers’ Networks” (with Jon Gant and Casey Ichniowski), April 1999.

“HRM Practices, Knowledge Capital, and the Changing Access to ‘Good’ Jobs,” June 12, 1998.

“Labor Supply, Human Capital Accumulation, and the Changing Distribution of Family Income,” 1996.

“Firm-Specific Fixed Effects in Franchise Contracting: Sources and Implications” (with Francine Lafontaine), December 1995.

“Investment in Industry Skills: Implications for Wage Growth and Worker Displacement,” December 1993.

11 “Labor Supply and Taxes: Estimates from a Life-Cycle Model Produce a Pessimistic View of Estimation Possibilities,” December 1992.

“Labor Supply and Taxes, 1967-1987” (with Randall Mariger), December 1991.

REFEREE

American Economic Review, Canadian Journal of Economics, Eastern Economic Journal, Economic Inquiry, Economic Journal, Economics of Education Review, Industrial Relations, International Economic Review, International Journal of Manpower, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Human Resources, Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Macroeconomics, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Regional Science Management Science, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economics and Statistics, Social Science Quarterly, Southern Economic Journal - National Science Foundation.

BUSINESS SCHOOL CASES

“Royal Bank of Canada: Using People Strategy and Analytics to Drive Employee Performance” (A) and (B), 2017, with Debra Schifrin.

“LinkedIn and Modern Recruiting” (A) and (B), 2015, with Debra Schifrin.

“Box: The Evolution of Management Practices in a Start-up,” 2015, with Debra Schifrin.

“Royal Bank of Canada: Transforming Managers” (A) and (B), 2015, with Debra Schifrin.

“Performance Evaluations: Bialecki Inc.,” 2008, with Katherine Bose.

“Shiny and New: The Evolution of ISG and ArcelorMittal Steel,” 2008, with Katherine Bose.

“Cinepolis: Changes to a Family-Owned Company,” 2007, with Bethany Coates.

“Amy Baker,” 2005, with Dani Kerrigan, Joanna Newman, and Alex Tauber.

“Sheryle Bolton (A),” 2005, with Carly Irestone, Angela Shelton, and Alex Tauber.

SERVICE ON COMMITTEES

GSB, Stanford University Committees:

Faculty Senate (2016-2017)

Mexico Study Trip (2017)

Argentina/Peru MBA Study Trip (2016)
Brazil MBA Study Trip (2015)
University Committee on Graduate Studies (2013-2018)
University Committee on Faculty Staff Human Resources (2013-2018)
Data Center Report (2011-2012)
Management-X Committee (2011-2012)
Kenya MBA Study Trip (2012)
Academic Coordinating Committee (2010-present)
Faculty Liaison GSB Student Newspaper (2010-2011)
University Committee on Evaluation of Human Resources (2009-2010)
Committee on Faculty Staff Human Resource (2007-2009)
Co-Director, Stanford GSB Summer Institute (2004-present)
Philippines MBA Study Trip (2006)
12Carnegie Mellon University Committees:
Budget and Finance Committee (2002-2003)
Chairman, Faculty Senate (1999)
Presidential Review Committee: The Social Sciences (1999)
University First Year Council (1996-1999)
President's Lecture Series Committee, (1998-1999)
Faculty Affairs Council (1996-1998) (Chair, 1996-1997)
Vice-Chairman, Faculty Senate (1998-1999)
Advising Award Committee (Co-chair) (1994-1997)
Advisory Committee for the Undergraduate Teaching Center (1992-1998)
Advisory Board of the Center of the Study of African Americans (1994-1998)
Executive Committee of the Faculty Senate (1996-1997)
Committee on Non-Tenured Appointments (1995-1996)
Senator for Faculty Senate (1994-1995)
University Parking Committee (1994-1995)
University Education Council (with new structure) (1993-1995)
Committee on Faculty Promotion and Tenure Policy (1993-1994)
Graduate Student Luncheon Series (presentation) (1994)
Committee on Flexible Rates for Employees (1994)

Selection Committee for University Award for Academic Advising (1993-1994)
“97 Network” Orientation (1993)
Human Relations Commission (1989-1992)
Committee on Academic Support Services (1991-1992)
H&SS Dean's Search Committee (1991-1992)
Committee on Non-tenured Appointments (1990-1992)
Ryan Award Committee (1989-1990) (1991-1992)
Teaching Center Orientation presentations (1992)
Advisory Committee on Family and Work (1989-1991)
Retention Committee (1990-1991)
Watson Fellowship Committee (1990-1991)
Flexible Benefits Advisory Group (1989-1990)
Educational Facilities Committee (1989-1991)
Gender Studies Committee, H&SS (1988-1989)
H&SS Subcommittee on Internships (1988-1989)
Fulbright Committee (1989-1990)
University Education Council (1987-1990)
Associate Deans Council (1987-1990)
CMU, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Committees:
MBA Curriculum Review Committee (2003)
GSIA Executive Education Faculty Advisory Board (2003)
Faculty MBA Funding Committee (2003)
Dean's Advisory Committee (2002-2003)
Engineering/MBA Planning Committee (chair), (2002-2003)
BS/BA Academic Actions Committee (2001-2003)
IM Policy Committee (1987-2003)
Strategy Recruiting Committee, (2001-2002)
MBA Curriculum Committee, (2001-2002)
Co-organizer CMU - University of Pittsburgh Applied Micro Workshop (1995-1999)
Economics Review Committee (1998)
Management Game Board (1981-1998, most years)
Dean's Advisory Council (1997)

13 Subcommittee on Sabbaticals (1996)

GSIA Committee on Women (Chair) (1994-1995)

Subcommittee Head, Tracks in IM (1992-1993)

IM Curriculum Review Committee (1991-1992)

Economics Curriculum Committee (1991-1992)

Advisory Committee on Undergraduate Economics (1990-1992)

ORGANIZATION OF CONFERENCES OR SESSIONS

Conference Co-Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 2019.

Conference Co-Organizer, "The Rise of the Mega-firm: Causes and Consequences for Labor and Product Markets," NBER, MIT, October 2018.

Conference Co-Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 2018.

Conference Co-Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 2017.

Conference Organizer, "Firm Heterogeneity and Income Inequality," Stanford, September 2016.

Conference Co-Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 2016.

Conference Co-Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 2015.

Conference Committee, Society of Labor Economics, 2015.

Conference Co-Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 24-25, 2014.

Conference Co-Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 27-28, 2013.

Conference Co-Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 26-27, 2012.

Conference Co-Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 28-30, 2011.

Conference Co-Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 27-30, 2010.

Conference Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 26-30, 2009.

Conference Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 30-31, 2008.

Conference Organizer, NBER Personnel and Labor Studies, Summer Institute, July 29-30, 2007.

Conference Co-Organizer and Sponsor, Conference on Firms and Employers, Ammersee, Germany, September 2006.

Conference Organizer, NBER Summer Institute, Personnel Economics, Cambridge, July 28, 2006.

Conference Co-Organizer, International Differences in the Business Practices and Productivity of Firms, Stanford University, January 19-20, 2005.

Conference Co-Organizer, "21 st Century Human Resource Management Practices and Their Effects on Firms and Workers," University of Illinois, November 11-12, 2005.

SEMINAR OR CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

Seminar or Conference Presentations, 2019

World Economic Forum, Global Future Council on the New Equality and Inclusion Agenda, Dubai, November 2019.

Discussant, Jackson Hole NBER conference on “Incentives and Limitations of Employment Policies on Retirement Transitions,” August 2019.

“The Effectiveness of HR Practices: Evidence from Insider Econometrics,” Keynote, IOEA, Corsica, May 2019.

“Spurring Serious Entrepreneurship: A Policy Experiment to Lower Entry Costs” with Anders Sorensen University of Illinois, economics seminar, October 2019

National University of Singapore, October 2019

Joe Tiao Lecturer, seminar, Kansas State University, November 2019

Goethe University, Frankfurt, June 2019

LMU, Munich, June 2019

LSE, London, May 2019

University College London, London, May 2019

“Unraveling the Mystery of Megafirm Success: Do the Internal HR Practices of Megafirms Differentiate Them?” with Chinhui Juhn, Kristin McCue, Brooks Pierce

Trans Pacific Labor Seminar, Tokyo, Japan, May 2019

“Management in the New Age of AI: An Economist’s Perspective” (talk, but not paper)

Joe Tiao Lecturer, public lecture, Kansas State University, November 2019

Copenhagen Business School, conference for Niels Westergard-Nielson, January 2019

Seminar or Conference Presentations, 2018

“The Productivity Advantage of Serial Entrepreneurs,” with Anders Sorensen Queens University, September 2018.

Society of Labor Economics, Toronto, May 2018.

Society of Institutional and Organizational Economics, Montreal, May 2018.

“Unraveling the Mystery of Megafirm Success: Do the Internal HR Practices of Megafirms Differentiate Them?” with Chinhui Juhn, Kristin McCue, Brooks Pierce

Seminar, Australian National University, December, 2018.

Personnel Economics Workshop meeting, Universidad de Los Andes, December 2018.

“Serious Entrepreneurs as Serial Entrepreneurs: What Accounts for Their Success?” with Anders Sorensen Society of Institutional and Organizational Economics, 2018.

Boconni University, CEPR, September 6-7, 2018.

Seminar, MIT, Innovation and Entrepreneurship seminar workshop, September 2018.

Trans Pacific Labor Studies, UCLA, October, 2018.

“Management in the New Age of AI: An Economist’s Perspective” (talk, but not paper)

NBER Conference on AI, August 2018.

Management Workshop, Universidad de Los Andes, December 2018.

Discussant, NBER Organizational Economics, Society for Institutional and Labor Economics (Montreal), May 2018.

Seminars or Conference Presentations, Recent Years through 2017

2017: AEA, Copenhagen Business School, NBER Organizational Economics (Boston); Leadership Conference (Barcelona); University of Groningen, NBER Summer Institute Entrepreneurship; NBER Hong Kong Meeting on Entrepreneurship; AASLE (Australia), Carnegie Mellon University, Stanford workshop, Stanford U.S/Japan conference.

2016: AEA (Boston), Copenhagen Business School, Trans Pacific Labor Studies (Santa Barbara), Kellogg Northwestern, Society of Labor Economists (Seattle), University of Maryland, NAS Conference on Entrepreneurship, University of Toronto, NBER Organizational Economics, Stanford Faculty Workshop, IZA, Erasmus University, Stanford “Bright Spots”

While the resume, above, is for one of Hillary Clinton’s biggest manipulators at Stanford University, her peer: Rodolfo Cortes Barragan, takes issue with her agenda, per:

Stanford University Staff say: “Odds of Hillary Winning Primaries WITHOUT Fraud Were 1 in 77 Billion”

By Matt Agorist

Since the beginning of the year, the political election process has exposed Americans to more corruption and vote rigging than at any time in their history. The allegations of fraud and vote-rigging even sparked the interest of several academic researchers who published a report on their findings earlier this month — what they discovered in their research is disturbing.

What the research shows is that Clinton’s sweeping victories could not have been possible — without fraud on a massive scale.

As Alexander Higgins reports, one of the statistical models applied by Standford University researcher Rodolfo Cortes Barragan to a subset of the data found that the probability of the “huge discrepancies” of which “nearly all are in favor of Hillary Clinton by a huge margin” was “statistically impossible” and that “the probability of this happening was is 1 in 77 billion.”

According to Higgins report, Analysis also showed repeatedly irregularities and statistically impossible reverses in reported live votes in several locations across the country.

In commenting on the research, Barragan stated that some of the models are rock solid and 59 years old and the results seen here have never been witnessed in non-fraudulent election during that time period.

To summarize, at least four different independent studies were conducted with various statistical models applied.

The researchers applied the different statistical models to:

1. Actual vote counts as they were reported
2. Discrepancies in polling data verse actual counts.
3. Various subsets of demographic polling data verse actual vote counts

The results of each study corroborated the results of the others and some of the researchers have reviewed the work of the others and go onto to confirm the findings in those studies.

It will take months for the studies to undergo peer review.

However, all of their research statistically proved there must have been widespread fraud to create the discrepancies in the vote counts that exist in all 3 subsets of the data analyzed. The research of Barragan, done collaboratively with Axel Geijssels of Tilburg University in The Netherlands, corroborates independent mathematical research conducted by Richard Charnin.

Further independent research was conducted by Beth Clarkson of Berkeley who also not only corroborated the two previous studies but reviewed them and after her research was done and confirmed their results.

Beginning in Iowa and eventually getting blown wide open in Arizona, the fraud and suppression of votes have let Americans know that their rulers are selected not elected.

Examples of this fraud were captured on video, documented on paper, and even broadcast live on television.

In Iowa, to break the supposed ties between Clinton and Sanders, the precincts held actual coin flips to decide this most crucial primary of the cycle. Clinton won all 6. However, the video below clearly shows Sanders winning at least one of those coin flips that was credited to Clinton.

But it doesn't stop there, the fraud was so rampant and on display that a C-SPAN video even caught it.

As the primary moved to Nevada, another blatant act of election rigging was captured on video. As a poll worker tries to stop them from entering before they are registered, dozens of voters, wearing Clinton T-Shirts, walked right past the caucus registration booth to participate in the caucus. They never registered.

In March, Clinton brought in her husband to break the law for her, giving her an upper hand at polling sites during the Massachusetts primary.

Bill Clinton blatantly violated Massachusetts election law that states campaigning within 150 feet of a polling site on election day is a felony, as reported by KTAR News. Not only did Bill Clinton campaign well within 150 feet of multiple election sites during voting hours causing gridlock, he even entered polling sites, with his security detail effectively shutting down the voting while the former president was present.

Another dysfunctional disaster unfolded in Arizona which led to even more people waking up to the fraud. The election rigging was so obvious that a hearing was held the following week in the HouseGallery to discuss possible courses of action to correct it.

In April, during that hearing on the election challenge, a Maricopa County poll worker testified the computer system she used to check in voters would not allow her to give the correct ballots to voters.

The testimony from Dianne Post confirmed the rampant voter suppression and election rigging which led to the hearing taking place. Post, who is an attorney in Maricopa County, testified a machine she was using to check in voters at a location failed to give 36 people the proper ballot.

It gets worse. According to Post, another 22 people at her location were listed in the wrong party and their polling place ran out of ballots for at least two congressional districts.

“Every single time it happened to me it was a Democratic voter who wasn’t able to access a Democratic ballot,” she said.

Post was only one person in one station, the allegations of suppression spread throughout the state.

Sadly, it seems, that all of this evidence of fraud and rampant corruption is hardly enough to register as a blip on the establishment radar. In spite of the criminal evidence against her, the unscrupulous control Clinton illustrates over the media has allowed for and promoted her savior-like persona. Perhaps if Americans were more concerned with the rigged game of selecting their rulers than they are with the rigging of a basketball game — we may not find ourselves in such a despotic state.

Jay Symopoulos reports, in light of this, that A major lawsuit is on the precipice of being filed by the Institute for American Democracy and Election Integrity, the implications of which could dramatically alter the landscape of the U.S. presidential race.

The group claims that in about eleven states, there has been noted a significant difference between the exit polls and the electronic vote totals presented on the morning after the primaries. These differences show votes appear to be shifted from Bernie Sanders to Hillary Clinton. The chances of this kind of shift happening are considered to be statistically impossible between Tuesday night and Wednesday morning in these eleven states. See the chart below. “We are going to be filing a racketeering lawsuit under the Ohio Racketeering law, the strongest in the country and we can bring in every state, our RICO statute is coextensive with the federal RICO statute... So they’re nailed,” said Cliff Arnebeck.

Arnebeck, an election lawyer, got his J.D. from Harvard and is the chair of the Legal Affairs Committee of Common Cause Ohio and a national co-chair and attorney for the Alliance of Democracy. He will be joined by Bob Fittrakis, an election lawyer and political science professor, as co-counsel.

Computer security expert Stephen Spoonamore, who worked with Arnebeck on exposing GOP election fraud in Ohio has noted that when exit poll data varies more than 2% from electronic vote totals, the electronic vote totals are questionable.

In fact, 2% is the boundary by the US government when determining whether an election in another country has possibly been stolen. Please notice the exit poll differences in the 2016 DNC primaries listed above are significantly more than 2%. These differences point to questionable results for the electronic vote totals and likely electronic vote switching.

“This is not a Republican-Democrat issue, this is not a partisan issue, this is a Democracy issue, if you actually care about a Constitutional democracy in which each person votes, that vote is validated and the people who end up in office are reflected on the basis of the way people voted you care about this issue,” said Spoonamore.

According to the Institute for American Democracy and Election Integrity: **IMPORTANT NOTE:** Although we have taken note of the shift here from Sanders to Clinton, we are NOT in any way stating who has done the shifting. **WE DO NOT KNOW WHO HAS DONE THE SHIFTING OF THE ELECTRONIC VOTE TOTALS.** This situation has galvanized three organizations, The Institute for American Democracy and Election Integrity (ADE) , the Columbus Institute of Contemporary Journalism, and Democracy Counts to set up our own exit polls and audits to track apparent election results in California.

Richard Charnin, a mathematician and statistician and author of the book, Matrix of Deceit, has been reporting on the apparent shifting of electronic vote totals and the non-release of raw data from Edison since 2004. Richard Charnin, well-known for what he calls the “Red Shift” which has been a shift between exit polls and electronic vote total differences of about 4-5% each year. This constitutes a shift to the political right. Although he is unable to analyze the raw data, he has been able to get screen shots of what the exit polls showed minutes before all of the electronic votes have been totaled since 2004.

Is Stanford University the center for digital election data manipulation in America?

In 2004, when Edison Research initially got exit poll data that said that Kerry was winning and Bush was losing at 9pm on election night and that the reverse was true shortly after midnight, Edison Research made a choice to “adjust” the raw data after that time so that it would match the electronic voting machine totals. Edison Research definitely wanted to keep being hired by the Media Consortium which proposes to tell viewers the true election results but which also chooses to trust electronic voting machine data. That was the last time that the American public has been able to see raw exit poll data.

Unfortunately this year, substantial exit poll differences have been noted in the US primary.

In this year's primary, the Red Shift appears to have become the "Clinton Shift". Arnebeck was the lead attorney, with Fitrakis as his co-counsel in the King Lincoln Bronzeville v. Blackwell case, which exposed electronic vote rigging in Ohio's 2004 presidential race. During the lawsuit, a very revealing deposition of Michael Connell, head IT guru for the Bush family and Karl Rove, provided insight into how the election fraud conspiracy operated.

According to a report by Truth-out: Connell served as the IT guru for the Bush family and Karl Rove. Connell ran the private IT firm GovTech that created the controversial system that transferred Ohio's vote count late on election night 2004 to a partisan Republican server site in Chattanooga, Tennessee owned by SmarTech. That is when the vote shift happened, not predicted by the exit polls, that led to Bush's unexpected victory. Connell died a month and a half after giving this deposition in a suspicious small plane crash.

One can clearly see how deep the rabbit hole goes, as the one person who could implicate the actual individuals responsible for the election fraud conspiracy happens to have an "accident" that kills him.

Essentially the investigation could go no further upon the suspicious death of Connell, thus protecting those behind the conspiracy.

Given these facts, it's apparent that Arnebeck and his team are the real deal, and have experience in bringing a major legal action involving voter fraud and electronic vote rigging/switching.

Initially, the new lawsuit was to be filed on June 6, as stated in the video release announcing the results of their investigation, but the filing was delayed due to ADE wanting to include data from California's primary, which was held on June 7.

Suspiciously, the Media Consortium and Edison Research, which control election polling, has now decided to cancel the remaining exit polls for the 2016 primaries. Many suspect these exit polls have been canceled because these exit poll differences could be used as an indicator of election fraud when contrasted with electronic voting totals.

"There is no way the Democratic Convention is going to nominate somebody on the basis of obviously stolen votes...the facts are coming out and that's a fact...We are suing the media as being complicit in the crime. They are acting as accessories after the fact. They are covering up evidence of criminal activity, it's a crime," said Arnebeck.

In my opinion Hillary Clinton has been used for the purpose of scuttling Bernie Sanders campaign for president, she is being used...but they've been caught, it's obvious, it's just like Bernie Sanders when he talks about the system is rigged, ah the elections are rigged, the evidence is clear, everybody's gonna see it and the game is over...Bernie has won in fact..."

The fact that electronic vote rigging is currently taking place, while the mainstream corporate media remains curiously silent, indicates a massive fraud being perpetrated on the American public. Make no mistake, had the vote been closer in the GOP primary the nomination would likely have been stolen from Trump in the same manner. This isn't a partisan issue, but one that slashes across the political spectrum and should alarm every American.

The time has come to ask ourselves who is behind the stealing of U.S. elections, and maybe more importantly; why does nobody in a position of authority seem interested in finding out?

In the video below Arnebeck breaks down how they prevented the Ohio presidential race from being stolen in 2012 and explains exactly what is taking place in this election cycle.

<http://thefreethoughtproject.com/election-fraud-rico-lawsuit-alleging-widespread-e-vote-rigging-dnc-primaries-derail-clinton-nomination/>

...would that make you a zealot? Are Stanford Guidance Counselors encouraging inhuman robotic information consumption?



John Doerr's Secret Stanford Strings

When an oligarch wants what he wants, he pulls some strings. In this case, the strings wind back to a spider-web of political and economic manipulation that even the Italian Mafia was jealous of...

Neetu Chandak reports that Stanford University has been forced to expel students connected to the nationwide admissions bribery scandal. John Doerr is one of the parents who Stanford has admitted to paying bribes.

"We determined that some of the material in the student's application is false and, in accordance with our policies, have rescinded admission," Stanford said in a [statement](#) April 2. "Any credits earned have also been vacated. The student is no longer on Stanford's campus."

Stanford added the student was referenced in a [previous statement](#), and was allegedly associated with a sailing program contribution made several months after being admitted to the university.

The contribution sent after the student was admitted was reported to be \$500,000, according to [The Associated Press](#).

Former Stanford sailing coach [John Vandemoer](#) pleaded guilty March 12 for accepting bribes in exchange for recommending two prospective students for admission.

The expelled student was accepted through the standard admissions process, not by an athletic recruiter, according to [CBS News](#). **[\(RELATED: Betsy DeVos Sets Her Sights On College Admissions Scandal\)](#)**


Stanford is not the first to rescind applications for those linked to the scam. [Yale University](#) rescinded the application of one student allegedly connected to the scandal.

The [University of Southern California](#) said it would deny entry to those connected to the scandal and were in the current admissions cycle.

The [University of California at Los Angeles](#) expressed canceling admission for current and prospective students implicated in the scandal as well.

The bribery scandal allegedly involved at least 50 people, including John Doerr, "Full House" actress [Lori Loughlin](#) and "Desperate Housewives" star Felicity Huffman. The scam involved cheating on [SAT](#) and ACT college entry exams and bribing college athletic coaches.

Stanford did not immediately respond to The Daily Caller News Foundation's request for comment.



The Spies Among Us

The CIA Runs Part Of Stanford University. SRI = CIA

I was a “Stargate Student”. This is what is publicly known about it.

Stargate Project was a secret [U.S. Army](#) unit established in 1978 at [Fort Meade, Maryland](#), by the [Defense Intelligence Agency](#) (DIA) and [SRI International](#) (a California contractor) to investigate the potential for [psychic](#) phenomena in military and domestic intelligence applications. The Project, and its precursors and sister projects, originally went by various [code names](#)—GONDOLA WISH, STARGATE, GRILL FLAME, CENTER LANE, PROJECT CF, SUN STREAK, SCANATE—until 1991 when they were consolidated and rechristened as "Stargate Project".

Stargate Project work primarily involved [remote viewing](#), the purported ability to psychically "see" events, sites, or [information](#) from a great distance.^[1] The project was overseen until 1987 by Lt. Frederick Holmes "Skip" Atwater, an aide and "psychic headhunter" to Maj. Gen. [Albert Stubblebine](#), and later president of the [Monroe Institute](#).^[2] The unit was small-scale, comprising about 15 to 20 individuals, and was run out of "an old, leaky wooden barracks".^[3]

The Stargate Project was supposedly terminated and declassified in 1995 after a [CIA](#) report concluded that it was never useful in any intelligence operation. That is the “official story”.

As of March 2021, The United States, Russia and China have spent over a trillion dollars researching “quantum mental powers” like this. The research not only never ended, it was amplified, mostly by Russia.

Information provided by the program was vague and included irrelevant and erroneous data, and there was reason to suspect that its project managers had changed the reports so they would fit background cues.^[4]:5–4 The program was featured in the [2004 book](#) and [2009 film](#), both titled *The Men Who Stare at Goats*,^{[5][6][7][8]} although neither mentions it by name.

Information in the [United States](#) on psychic research in some foreign countries was poorly detailed, based mostly on rumor or innuendo from second-hand or tertiary reporting, attributed to both reliable and unreliable [disinformation](#) sources from the [Soviet Union](#).^[citation needed]

The CIA and DIA decided they should investigate and know as much about it as possible. Various programs were approved yearly and re-funded accordingly. Reviews were made semi-annually at the Senate and House [select committee](#) level. Work results were reviewed, and remote viewing was attempted with the results being kept secret from the "viewer". It was thought that if the viewer was shown they were incorrect it would damage the viewer's confidence and skill. This was standard operating procedure throughout the years of military and domestic remote viewing programs. Feedback to the remote viewer of any kind was rare; it was kept classified and secret.^{[9]2021}}}

Remote viewing attempts to sense unknown information about places or events. Normally it is performed to detect current events, but during military and domestic intelligence applications viewers claimed to sense things in the future, experiencing [precognition](#).^[10]

History

1970s

In 1970 United States intelligence sources believed that the Soviet Union was spending 60 million [rubles](#) annually on "[psychotronic](#)" research. In response to claims that the Soviet program had produced results, the CIA initiated funding for a new program known as SCANATE ("scan by coordinate") in the same year.^[11] [Remote viewing](#) research began in 1972 at the [Stanford Research Institute](#) (SRI) in [Menlo Park, California](#).^[11] Proponents ([Russell Targ](#) and [Harold Puthoff](#)) of the research said that a minimum accuracy rate of 65% required by the clients was often exceeded in the later experiments.^[11]

[Physicists Russell Targ](#) and [Harold Puthoff](#) began testing psychics for SRI in 1972, including one who would later become an international celebrity, Israeli [Uri Geller](#). Their apparently successful results garnered interest within the [U.S. Department of Defense](#). [Ray Hyman](#), professor of psychology at the [University of Oregon](#), was asked by Air Force psychologist Lt. Col. Austin W. Kibler (1930–2008)—then Director of Behavioral Research for [ARPA](#)—to go to SRI and investigate. He was to specifically evaluate Geller. Hyman's report to the government was that Geller was a "complete fraud" and as a consequence Targ and Puthoff lost their government contract to do further work with him. The result was a publicity tour for Geller, Targ and Puthoff, to seek private funding for further research work on Geller.^[12]

One of the project's successes was the location of a lost Soviet spy plane in 1976 by Rosemary Smith, a young administrative assistant recruited by project director Dale Graff.^[13]

In 1977 the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) Systems Exploitation Detachment (SED) started the GONDOLA WISH program to "evaluate potential adversary applications of remote viewing."^[11] Army Intelligence then formalized this in mid-1978 as an operational program GRILL FLAME, based in buildings 2560 and 2561 at [Fort Meade](#), in Maryland ([INSCOM](#) "Detachment G").^[11]

1980s

In early 1979 the research at SRI was integrated into GRILL FLAME, which was redesignated INSCOM CENTER LANE Project (ICLP) in 1983. In 1984 the existence of the program was reported by [Jack Anderson](#), and in that year it was unfavorably received by the [National Academy of Sciences](#) [National Research Council](#). In late 1985 the Army funding was terminated, but the program was redesignated SUN STREAK and funded by the DIA's Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate (office code DT-S).^[11]

1990s

In 1991 most of the contracting for the program was transferred from SRI to [Science Applications International Corporation](#) (SAIC), with Edwin May controlling 70% of the contractor funds and 85% of the data. Its security was altered from [Special Access Program](#) (SAP) to Limited Dissemination ([LIMDIS](#)), and it was given its final name, STAR GATE.[11]

Closure (1995)

In 1995 the defense appropriations bill directed that the program be transferred from DIA to CIA oversight. The CIA commissioned a report by [the American Institutes for Research](#) (AIR) that found that remote viewing had not been proved to work by a psychic mechanism, and said it had not been used operationally.[4]:5–4 The CIA subsequently cancelled and declassified the program.[11]

In 1995 the project was transferred to the [CIA](#) and a retrospective evaluation of the results was done. The appointed panel consisted primarily of [Jessica Utts](#) and [Ray Hyman](#). Hyman had produced an unflattering report on Uri Geller and SRI for the government two decades earlier, but the psychologist [David Marks](#) found Utts' appointment to the review panel "puzzling" given that she had published papers with Edwin May, considering this joint research likely to make her "less than [im]partial".[1] A report by Utts claimed the results were evidence of psychic functioning; however, Hyman in his report argued Utts' conclusion that ESP had been proven to exist, especially precognition, was premature and the findings had not been independently replicated.[14] Hyman came to the conclusion:

Psychologists, such as myself, who study subjective validation find nothing striking or surprising in the reported matching of reports against targets in the Stargate data. The overwhelming amount of data generated by the viewers is vague, general, and way off target. The few apparent hits are just what we would expect if nothing other than reasonable guessing and subjective validation are operating.[15]

A later report by AIR came to a negative conclusion. [Joe Nickell](#) has written:

Other evaluators – two psychologists from AIR – assessed the potential intelligence-gathering usefulness of remote viewing. They concluded that the alleged psychic technique was of dubious value and lacked the concreteness and reliability necessary for it to be used as a basis for making decisions or taking action. The final report found "reason to suspect" that in "some well publicised cases of dramatic hits" the remote viewers might have had "substantially more background information" than might otherwise be apparent.[16]

According to AIR, which performed a review of the project, no remote viewing report ever provided actionable information for any intelligence operation.[17][4]:5–4

Based upon the collected findings, which recommended a higher level of critical research and tighter controls, the CIA terminated the 20 million dollar project, citing a lack of documented evidence that the program had any value to the intelligence community. *Time* magazine stated in 1995 three full-time psychics were still working on a \$500,000-a-year budget out of [Fort Meade, Maryland](#), which would soon close.[17]

David Marks in his book [The Psychology of the Psychic](#) (2000) discussed the flaws in the Stargate Project in detail.[1] Marks wrote that there were six negative design features of the experiments. The

possibility of cues or [sensory leakage](#) was not ruled out, no [independent replication](#), some of the experiments were conducted in secret making peer-review impossible. Marks noted that the judge Edwin May was also the principal investigator for the project and this was problematic making huge conflict of interest with collusion, cuing and fraud being possible. Marks concluded the project was nothing more than a "subjective delusion" and after two decades of research it had failed to provide any scientific evidence for the legitimacy of remote viewing.[\[1\]](#)

The Stargate Project was claimed[\[by whom?\]](#) to have been terminated in 1995 following an independent review which concluded:

The foregoing observations provide a compelling argument against continuation of the program within the intelligence community. Even though a statistically significant effect has been observed in the laboratory, it remains unclear whether the existence of a paranormal phenomenon, remote viewing, has been demonstrated. The laboratory studies do not provide evidence regarding the origins or nature of the phenomenon, assuming it exists, nor do they address an important methodological issue of inter-judge reliability.

Further, even if it could be demonstrated unequivocally that a paranormal phenomenon occurs under the conditions present in the laboratory paradigm, these conditions have limited applicability and utility for intelligence gathering operations. For example, the nature of the remote viewing targets are vastly dissimilar, as are the specific tasks required of the remote viewers. Most importantly, the information provided by remote viewing is vague and ambiguous, making it difficult, if not impossible, for the technique to yield information of sufficient quality and accuracy of information for actionable intelligence. Thus, we conclude that continued use of remote viewing in intelligence gathering operations is not warranted.[\[4\]](#):E-4–E-5

In January 2017, the CIA published records online of the Stargate Project as part of the CREST archive. [\[18\]](#)

The Stargate Project created a set of protocols designed to make the research of [clairvoyance](#) and [out-of-body experiences](#) more [scientific](#), and to minimize as much as possible session noise and inaccuracy. The term "[remote viewing](#)" emerged as shorthand to describe this more structured approach to clairvoyance. Project Stargate would only receive a mission after all other intelligence attempts, methods, or approaches had already been exhausted.[\[10\]](#):21

It was reported that at peak manpower there were over 22 active military and civilian remote viewers providing data. People leaving the project were not replaced. When the project closed in 1995 this number had dwindled down to three. One was using tarot cards. According to [Joseph McMoneagle](#), "The Army *never* had a truly open attitude toward psychic functioning". Hence, the use of the term "giggle factor"[\[19\]](#) and the saying, "I wouldn't want to be found dead next to a psychic."[\[9\]](#)

Hal Puthoff

In the 1970s, [CIA](#) and [DIA](#) granted funds to [Harold E. Puthoff](#) to investigate [paranormal](#) abilities, collaborating with [Russell Targ](#) in a study of the purported [psychic abilities](#) of [Uri Geller](#), [Ingo Swann](#),

[Pat Price](#), [Joseph McMoneagle](#) and others, as part of the Stargate Project,[\[20\]](#) of which Puthoff became a director.[\[21\]](#)

As with Ingo Swann and Pat Price, Puthoff attributed much of his personal remote viewing skills to his involvement with [Scientology](#) whereby he had attained, at that time, the highest level. All three eventually left Scientology in the late 1970s.

Puthoff worked as the principal investigator of the project. His team of psychics is said to have identified spies, located Soviet weapons and technologies, such as a nuclear submarine in 1979 and helped find lost [SCUD missiles](#) in the first [Gulf War](#) and plutonium in [North Korea](#) in 1994.[\[22\]](#)

Russell Targ

Main article: [Russell Targ](#)

In the 1970s, Russell Targ began working with Harold Puthoff on Stargate Project, while working with him as a researcher at [Stanford Research Institute](#).[\[23\]\[24\]](#)

Edwin May

Edwin C. May joined the Stargate Project in 1975 as a consultant and was working full-time in 1976. The original project was part of the Cognitive Sciences Laboratory managed by May. With more funding in 1991 May took the project to the Palo Alto offices at SAIC. This would last until 1995 when the CIA closed the project.[\[1\]](#)

May worked as the principal investigator, judge and the star gatekeeper for the project. Marks says this was a serious weakness for the experiments as May had conflict of interest and could have done whatever he wanted with the data. Marks has written that May refused to release the names of the "oversight committee" and refused permission for him to give an independent judging of the star gate transcripts. Marks found this suspicious, commenting "this refusal suggests that something must be wrong with the data or with the methods of data selection."[\[1\]](#)

Ingo Swann

Main article: [Ingo Swann](#)

Originally tested in the "Phase One" were OOBE-Beacon "RV" experiments at the [American Society for Psychological Research](#),[\[25\]\[unreliable source?\]](#) under research director [Karlis Osis](#).[\[citation needed\]](#) A former [OT VII](#) Scientologist,[\[26\]\[self-published source\]](#) who alleged to have coined the term 'remote viewing' as a derivation of protocols originally developed by [René Warcollier](#), a French chemical engineer in the early 20th century, documented in the book *Mind to Mind, Classics in Consciousness Series Books* by ([ISBN 9781571743114](#)). Swann's achievement was to break free from the conventional mold of casual experimentation and candidate burn out, and develop a viable set of protocols that put clairvoyance within a framework named "Coordinate Remote Viewing" (CRV).[\[27\]](#) In a 1995 letter Edwin C. May wrote he had not used Swann for two years because there were rumors of him briefing a high level person at [SAIC](#) and the [CIA](#) on remote viewing and aliens, ETs.[\[28\]](#)

Pat Price

A former Burbank, California, police officer and former Scientologist who participated in a number of [Cold War](#) era [remote viewing](#) experiments, including the US government-sponsored projects [SCANATE](#) and the Stargate Project. Price joined the program after a chance encounter with fellow Scientologists (at the time) Harold Puthoff and Ingo Swann near SRI.[\[29\]](#) Working with maps and photographs provided to him by the CIA, Price claimed to have been able to retrieve information from facilities behind Soviet lines. He is probably best known for his sketches of cranes and gantries which appeared to conform to CIA intelligence photographs. At the time, the CIA took his claims seriously.[\[30\]](#)

Major General Albert Stubblebine

Main article: [Albert Stubblebine](#)

A key sponsor of the research internally at [Fort Meade](#), Maryland, Maj. Gen. Stubblebine was convinced of the reality of a wide variety of psychic phenomena. He required that all of his battalion commanders learn how to bend spoons a la [Uri Geller](#), and he himself attempted several psychic feats, even attempting to walk through walls. In the early 1980s he was responsible for the [United States Army Intelligence and Security Command](#) (INSCOM), during which time the remote viewing project in the US Army began. Some commentators have confused a "Project Jedi", allegedly run by [Special Forces](#) primarily out of [Fort Bragg](#), with Stargate. After some controversy involving these experiments, including alleged security violations from uncleared civilian psychics working in Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs), Major General Stubblebine was placed on retirement. His successor as the INSCOM commander was Major General [Harry Soyster](#), who had a reputation as a much more conservative and conventional intelligence officer. MG Soyster was not amenable to continuing paranormal experiments and the Army's participation in Project Stargate ended during his tenure.[\[9\]](#)

David Morehouse

In his book, *Psychic Warrior: Inside the CIA's Stargate Program : The True Story of a Soldier's Espionage and Awakening* (2000, St. Martin's Press, [ISBN 978-1902636207](#)), Morehouse claims to have worked on hundreds of [Remote Viewing](#) assignments, from searching for a [Soviet](#) jet that crashed in the jungle carrying an [atomic bomb](#), to tracking suspected [double agents](#).[\[31\]](#)

Joseph McMoneagle

Main article: [Joseph McMoneagle](#)

McMoneagle claims he had a remarkable memory of very early childhood events. He grew up surrounded by alcoholism, abuse and poverty. As a child, he had visions at night when scared, and began to hone his psychic abilities in his teens for his own protection when he hitchhiked. He enlisted to get away. McMoneagle became an experimental remote viewer while serving in U.S. Army Intelligence.[\[9\]](#)

Ed Dames

Dames was one of the first five Army students trained by Ingo Swann through Stage 3 in coordinate remote viewing.^{[[citation needed](#)]} Because Dames' role was intended to be as session monitor and analyst as an aid to Fred Atwater^{[[32](#)]}^{[[self-published source](#)]} rather than a remote viewer, Dames received no further formal remote viewing training. After his assignment to the remote viewing unit at the end of January 1986, he was used to "run" remote viewers (as monitor) and provide training and practice sessions to viewer personnel. He soon established a reputation for pushing CRV to extremes, with target sessions on [Atlantis](#), [Mars](#), [UFOs](#), and aliens. He is a frequent guest on the [Coast to Coast AM](#) radio shows.^{[[33](#)]}^{[[unreliable source](#)]}

See also

- [The Men Who Stare at Goats](#)

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Stanford University Is a cesspool of spies and foreign bribes from the governments of China, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

- 32 San Francisco families are under investigation for influence-peddling Stanford

The Education Department has been asked to run investigations into Stanford University, who has been caught accepting bribes to place rich kids in the school, as part of a continuing review that it says has found U.S. universities failed to report at least \$6.5 billion in foreign funding from countries such as China and Saudi Arabia, according to department materials viewed by The Wall Street Journal.

The investigations into the Ivy League schools are the latest in a clash between U.S. universities and a coalition of federal officials including law enforcement, research funders such as the National Institutes of Health, and a bipartisan group in Congress that has raised concerns about higher-education institutions' reliance on foreign money, particularly from China.

Representatives for Stanford said the regents "hope to avoid any trouble".

The department described higher-education institutions in the U.S., in a document viewed by the Journal, as “multi-billion dollar, multi-national enterprises using opaque foundations, foreign campuses, and other sophisticated legal structures to generate revenue.”

U.S. universities have generally defended their international collaborations and said the Education Department's reporting requirements remain unclear, which officials deny.

Universities are required to disclose to the Education Department all contracts and gifts from a foreign source that, alone or combined, are worth \$250,000 or more in a calendar year. Though the statute is decades old, the department only recently began to vigorously enforce it.

Officials accused schools of actively soliciting money from foreign governments, companies and nationals known to be hostile to the U.S. and potentially in search of opportunities to steal research and “spread propaganda benefitting foreign governments,” according to the document.

In addition, while the department said it has found foreign money generally flows to the country’s richest universities, “such money apparently does not reduce or otherwise offset American students’ tuition costs,” the document said.

Should Stanford University be wary of accepting money from foreign governments hostile to the U.S., such as China, Russia and Iran?

U.S. officials say China uses a variety of means to target academia, including government-funded talent recruitment programs such as the Thousand Talents Plan. [The arrest last month of the chairman of Harvard’s chemistry department](#) on federal charges of lying about receiving millions of dollars in Chinese funding through the program while the U.S. shelled out more than \$15 million to fund his research group catapulted the issue into the spotlight.

In a letter to Harvard dated Tuesday and posted on the Education Department website, officials cited the recent Justice Department case and asked the school to disclose records of gifts or contracts involving the governments of China, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran. It also requested records regarding telecommunications giants Huawei Technologies Co. and [ZTE](#) Corp. of China; the Kaspersky Lab and Skolkovo Foundation of Russia; and the Alavi Foundation of Iran, among others.

The Education Department said Yale had failed to disclose at least \$375 million in foreign funding after filing no reports from 2014-17, according to a document viewed by the Journal. The department, also in a letter Tuesday to the university, sought records regarding contributions from Saudi Arabia, China and its telecom giants, Peking University’s Yenching Academy, the National University of Singapore, Qatar and others. It also asked the university to detail foreign funding of Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center and the new Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs.

The Education Department is alleging that Yale University didn’t disclose at least \$375 million in foreign funding and is seeking records from the school.

If the schools refuse to disclose the information, the Education Department can refer the matter to the Justice Department, which could pursue civil or criminal actions.

Some university officials have dismissed the U.S. government’s broader national security concerns regarding foreign involvement in universities as hyperbolic, or even discriminatory, and said there should be no restrictions on unclassified research meant to be published anyway.

They have also said international collaboration—particularly with China—is essential to advancing scientific discoveries that will benefit humankind.

A February 2019 investigation by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations called foreign government funding of U.S. universities “a black hole” and said it found that nearly 70% failed to properly report funding from Chinese government-backed cultural and language programs known as Confucius Institutes.

Sens. Rob Portman (R., Ohio) and Tom Carper (D., Del.), who lead the Senate panel, said in a joint statement the Journal: “The fact that \$6.5 billion in foreign gifts to U.S. institutions went unreported until now is shocking and unacceptable...We are pleased that the Department of Education is increasing enforcement efforts and taking a step towards ensuring academic freedom in America.”

Education Department officials in June 2019 launched a series of investigations into universities’ foreign funding. The Harvard and Yale investigations are the department’s seventh and eighth probes following others at schools including Georgetown University, Cornell University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Education Department officials said in the document viewed by the Journal that its investigations have prompted public and private universities across the country to come forward since July 2019 to collectively report more than \$6.5 billion in previously undisclosed foreign funding.

A spokeswoman for MIT said the university’s reporting of foreign gifts and contracts has been based on “improved processes” since January 2019 and that it is committed to working constructively with federal officials. Georgetown and Cornell didn’t immediately comment.

The Education Department has hit back at university groups that have criticized its recent enforcement drive. For example, in a September 2019 letter addressed to one group that represents more than 200 universities, an official called the universities’ reporting duties “plainly evident.”

He added: “You have asked the Department to ‘work with the higher education community to...balance the interests of transparency and the complicated nature of reporting.’ There is no statutory basis for any such ‘balance.’”

Stanford university and Stanford medical servers have been hacked hundreds of times by spies using them for hacker-training

"Tele-Medicine" and "Doctor-Via-Zoom" may be a DOA concept. Your video chat with your psychologist about your fear of men, your Zoom talk with your gynecologist about your herpes or your web meeting with your proctologist about your anal warts could be **on the entire internet 48 hours later.**

Famous people went to Stanford, work at Stanford, and attend Stanford. Middle East elites, political operatives and rich families draw hackers, like flies, to the Stanford medical and scholastic servers. A bounty of hundreds of thousands of dollars is offered by dark webbers for a Clinton confessing to sex crimes, or a Kashoggi murder tip on an Arab shah. Every day, the tele-medicine videos at Stanford Medical are rife with elites and tabloid news targets revealing their darkest secrets. Solarwinds hackers and Julian Assange wannabe's are constantly sifting the video streams and server files at Stanford for juicy meat.

Stanford bosses claim to have bought "very high-end software" that is "hard to hack", but fail to comprehend that such a claim is juvenile. The entire U.S. Government was hacked in the Solarwinds hack, using ten times better software than Stanford has. It is ludicrous for Stanford bosses to deny the fact that hackers can romp through their servers with impunity.

Live, in-person, meetings with doctors in secured rooms, is the only solution. Trying to make the Sandhill Road venture capitalists richer by forcing the public to use the internet is a crime against society.

Stanford University is always being hit by embarrassing data breaches that expose the personal information of students, including home addresses, Social Security numbers and even test scores and essays.

The [Stanford Daily is reporting](#) that Stanford students could view applications and high-school transcripts of other students "if they first requested to view their own admission documents under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)." Documents that were compromised by the hackers including extremely sensitive personal information like Social Security numbers for some students, as well as "students' ethnicity, legacy status, home address, citizenship status, criminal status, standardized test scores, personal essays and whether they applied for financial aid. Official standardized test score reports were also accessible," the paper reported, which explained that while students' documents could not be search by name, the were "accessible by changing a numeric ID in a URL."

"We regret this vulnerability in our system and apologize to those whose records were inappropriately viewed," the school said in a statement released on Friday. "We have worked to remedy the situation as quickly as possible and will continue working to better protect our systems and data. Finding and fixing vulnerabilities before adversaries discover and exploit them is an ongoing and essential activity in systems management."

The breach comes 14 months after Stanford announced that a previously revealed hack of confidential information on a computer server at its Graduate School of Business was wider than had been reported earlier, according to Poets & Quants, a prominent online news site that covers the graduate-business school community. In that hack, the site reported, "campus privacy investigators found that a shared platform at the GSB potentially exposed the personal information of" thousands of people at the university." Like the recent hack, the 2017 breach compromised the personal data of students, including the "names, birthdates, Social Security numbers and salary information for nearly 10,000 non-teaching university employees – a snapshot taken in August 2008," said the report. "The file apparently was made accessible to human resources staff at the business school for annual salary setting. The file was exposed to the GSB community for six months before it was locked and secured" in the spring of 2017.

The 2017 attack ended up costing Stanford's chief digital officer his job. Ranga Jayaraman announced that he was leaving "after a student revealed that the school had not been forthcoming with its

fellowship grants,” this newspaper [reported at the time](#). In a statement, Jayaraman said “I take full responsibility for the failure to recognize the scope and nature of the ... data exposure and report it in a timely manner to the dean and the University Information Security and Privacy Office. I would like to express my most sincere apologies ... to anyone whose personal information might potentially have been compromised.”

According to the Stanford Daily, a student who had submitted a FERPA request in order to review the student’s own admissions documents discovered “the vulnerability in a third-party content management system called NolijWeb that the University has used since 2009 to host scanned files.” Anyone willing to submit such a request, going back to 2015, would have been able to examine the files through NolijWeb.” The Daily reported that this student, between Jan. 28 and 29, was able to access the records of 81 students. Who else saw the files

Other students who were told about the easy-to-access records were able to review personal information in 12 students’ records “during that time period while seeking to learn more about the kinds of files exposed.”

The Daily holds back

The newspaper also reported that it had held back on reporting about the exposed data until school officials “could secure the breach so that students’ records could be protected. The student who disclosed the breach to The Daily was granted anonymity to protect them from potential legal repercussions for accessing private information while investigating the security flaw,” said the paper.

The third-party content-management company is put on notice

The report says that Stanford notified Nolij’s parent company Hyland Software of the breach. Hyland, which has bought Nolij in 2017, had announced in late December that was discontinuing the NolijWeb product.

Stanford’s IT experts try to clean up the mess (but can't)

The Stanford University Information Technology (UIT) said it intended to implement “a new platform to replace the NolijWeb system by this summer,” said the Daily, adding that “a number of schools still use NolijWeb to store admissions records. It is unclear how many schools using NolijWeb give students access to the online documents, or how many might be subject to the vulnerability.”

The company’s response?

The Daily said its reporters had “reached out to eight different executives at Hyland Software for comment and expressed concern that other schools’ data may be similarly compromised by NolijWeb. Alexa Marinos, Hyland’s Senior Manager of Corporate Communications, confirmed receiving The Daily’s phone and email requests for comment, made over the course of a week. However, the company provided no statement on the matter.

Stanford students weigh in

Jonathan Lipman, sophomore, told this newspaper: “I’m glad the student who first discovered the breach acted morally and worked to have the breach closed before malicious actors scraped all undergraduate students’ admissions data. It’s a bit embarrassing that Stanford is using software that is no longer supported (NolijWeb was discontinued on December 31, 2018 according to its website). I think this demonstrates the importance of programs like the Bug Bounty. While I understand that UIT is concerned mostly with external security threats, I was both shocked and concerned that Stanford does not conduct security audits from multiple trust levels (student, staff, alumni, etc...). Some of the best hackers in the country have Stanford logins and it would seem prudent to conduct penetration tests accordingly.

“I can’t say I’m particularly shocked — Stanford has a sprawling IT infrastructure with many external vendors and legacy internal systems. It’s a difficult task to constantly maintain high levels of defense on all of these systems..”

Ben Esposito said: “Stanford keeps running into trouble over data breaches precisely because it holds an unnecessary large amount of data on its students. If it held only the most essential data, they would be better able to prioritize which data to keep especially secure.”

David Jaffe, also a sophomore, said: “Stanford should look into investing in the incredible abilities of it’s students by offering more opportunities for students to support the university’s IT infrastructure. I know many great students with underutilized technical skills that, from what I’ve noticed, have been more than happy to assist others for free just for the experience.”

Linkedin insider Anna Sofia Lesiv contributed reporting to this story. Jonathan Lipman provided critical data. Ben Esposito provided essential leads.

The NolijWeb hack was one of hundreds of hacks of the Stanford scholastic and medical servers. Your video chats with your doctor, shrink or teacher are NOT safe on Stanford servers. Stanford created the people who run Washington, DC and Silicon Valley. The families, children and connections to those people are of the highest possible interest to teen hackers, Chinese, Russian and Iranian state actors and others. Over 30 Chinese state spies are suspected to be under-cover, acting as "students" at Stanford. The digital realm around Stanford University and Stanford Medical is anything but "safe".

The liability, for Stanford, is off-the-charts. Stanford needs to get back to in-person classes and in-person doctor meetings or it could lose big with one huge negligence lawsuit.

[Stanford University's computer network hacked ... - ABC7 News](https://abc7news.com/archive/9184555/)

<https://abc7news.com/archive/9184555/>

Stanford University's computer network hacked again. kgo. By ABC7. ... Students aren't surprised Stanford has been targeted by hackers. ... and to verify sensitive data on its servers have not ...

[A data hack let Stanford students snoop on their classmates](https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/02/15/a-data-hack-let-stanford-students-snoop-on-their-classmates/)

<https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/02/15/a-data-hack-let-stanford-students-snoop-on-their-classmates/>

Feb 15, 2019For the second time in 15 months, Stanford University has been hit by an embarrassing data breach that exposed the personal information of students, including home addresses, Social Security ...

[Stanford University's computer network hacked again](https://news.yahoo.com/video/stanford-universitys-computer-network-hacked-020029916.html)

<https://news.yahoo.com/video/stanford-universitys-computer-network-hacked-020029916.html>

Stanford University's computer network hacked again July 25, 2013, 7:00 PM For the second time in less than three months, hackers have broken into Stanford University's computer network.

Stanford University hacked, becomes latest data breach ...

<https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/07/26/stanford-university-hacked-becomes-latest-data-breach-victim/>

Stanford bosses claim to be "not aware at this time" of any sensitive data that could have been harvested during the breach, and suggest it bears similarities to other "incidents reported in ...

Stanford's Pro-Rape Administration

- Stanford University Has A Pro-Rape, Pro-Frat Boy Policy At Behest Of Rich Globalist Oligarchs Who Control Campus Policy
- The rapists of Sand Hill Road Venture Capital are the men who control policy at Stanford University
- Female student was sexually assaulted, Stanford invited the man back to campus

By Nanette Asimov

Stanford graduate Sinéad Talley says Stanford's light punishment of her rapist feels like a second assault.

After Stanford University concluded that one of its students sexually assaulted a classmate, campus officials imposed what they called a very serious sanction: a suspension of two academic quarters.

The victim said it felt like a second assault.

"Providing my rapist with a gracious invitation back to Stanford pending a brief period of 'reflection' disrespects myself and the moral stature of Stanford as an institution," Sinéad Talley wrote on Dec. 20, 2016, in her unsuccessful appeal. She wanted Stanford to expel the man she said had been her friend until he raped her while she was in a drunken stupor.

Stanford reported the assault in 2016 to campus police, as required by state law. But Talley chose not to pursue the case through the criminal justice system. Instead, like many college students who report sexual assault, she turned to her university's internal justice system.

Former Stanford University student Brock Turner is appealing his sexual assault conviction after he raped an unconscious woman on Stanford University's campus. Turner is now asking for a new trial. Turner's legal team filed a 172-page appeal claiming the prosecutor incorrectly told jurors that the incident happened behind a dumpster. His defense team argues that Turner didn't try to hide anything and that the assault happened in an open setting.

Now Talley is speaking out to accuse the world-renowned university of protecting students who commit sexual assault by downplaying the severity of their behavior and rarely expelling them.

The data appear to back her up: Stanford received reports of 84 campus rapes from 2014 to 2016, according to information the university provided to the U.S. Department of Education, which requires campuses to collect crime statistics under the Clery Act. Stanford told the federal agency it received 33 of the rape reports in 2016 alone.

Yet the university expelled no students for sexual assault in those years. Instead, it arranged for three students to leave voluntarily, including former Stanford swimmer Brock Turner in 2015-16, said

spokesman E.J. Miranda. He said two students have been expelled for sexual assault, in 2001-02 and 2006-07.

Miranda said the university could not investigate all 84 reports of rape because some complainants never identified an assailant. Some who were identified couldn't be expelled because they weren't students, he said.

But questions remain even after a closer look.

In a 2016-17 report by Stanford on sexual misconduct on campus, the university said it conducted 12 investigations into reports of "nonconsensual intercourse," but lacked enough information to investigate another 12. The hearing panel found violations in four cases — against three students and a visiting researcher. Names are not included in the report, but one of those cases was Talley's.

A woman leaves the main quad at Stanford University in June 2016. Stanford received reports of 84 campus rapes from 2014 to 2016, according to information the university provided to the U.S. Department of Education, but no one was expelled. Photo: Leah Millis / The Chronicle 2016

A woman leaves the main quad at Stanford University in June 2016. Stanford received reports of 84 campus rapes from 2014 to 2016, according to information the university provided to the U.S. Department of Education, but no one was expelled.

In Talley's case, the panel deciding punishment did not expel the student because it found he didn't know she was incapacitated and didn't cause her to become incapacitated.

MORE BY NANETTE ASIMOV:

Report finds past harassment by UC professor, but punishment lags

UC Berkeley settles conservative students' free-speech lawsuit

CSU trustees approve pay raises for executives with six-figure salaries

Study: California public higher education leadership lacks diversity

Student loan servicer cheats borrowers, California attorney general says

Cal scrapped probe of football program promised after 2014 death of player

Yet in another case in the 2016-17 report, the hearing panel decided against expelling a student even though his offense met Stanford's threshold for expulsion, according to a footnote in the report. That is, the student committed sexual assault either by force, by incapacitating his victim, or by knowing that his victim was incapacitated and having sex with her anyway.

The panel "determined that a three-quarter suspension was the appropriate sanction," the footnote said, without explanation.

"Stanford has had tremendous reluctance to hold students accountable even when they are found responsible for the most serious violations. They just won't expel them. Instead, they give these laughably lenient penalties," said Michele Dauber, the Stanford law professor who led a successful

recall campaign last spring against the judge widely perceived to have imposed a too-light sentence on Turner, the freshman swimmer convicted of sexual assault in 2015.

Dauber had not heard of Talley's situation until The Chronicle described it. But she and several current and former students familiar with Stanford's policies agreed with Talley's assessment that the university fails to adequately punish students who commit sexual assault by kicking them out of school.

The university defended itself.

"We do not tolerate sexual assault at Stanford," Miranda said. "We seek to carefully weigh the facts and treat all parties fairly through our adjudication process, including the investigation and imposed sanctions."

Sinead Talley (right) is accuses Stanford University of protecting students who commit sexual assault by downplaying the severity of their behavior and rarely expelling them. Photo: Liz Hafalia / The Chronicle

Sinead Talley (right) is accuses Stanford University of protecting students who commit sexual assault by downplaying the severity of their behavior and rarely expelling them.

Talley said her experience shows that Stanford does tolerate sexual assault.

The Chronicle reviewed university records of the case, interviewed Talley and attempted many times to reach the other former student involved, without success. Stanford officials responded only to written questions relayed through Miranda.

The Chronicle is not naming the former student because he was not charged with a crime. The Chronicle does not typically name victims of sexual assault unless, like Talley, they wish to be identified.

Rush week was in full force at Stanford in April 2014 when a friend of Talley's accepted a bid from his favorite fraternity. He invited her to the celebration.

In a written account she gave to Stanford investigators, Talley said she felt exhausted on the night of the party and hadn't been sleeping well or eating enough for some time. She had a few drinks at the party. Her next memory was waking up the next morning naked and sore, aware that the student was in her room, and aware when he "slipped out," according to the account, a long letter she wrote to the student two years later detailing her experience.

"I didn't report what you did," Talley wrote. "I refused to acknowledge that it had been rape for weeks afterward."

She blamed herself.

"I made excuses for you, convinced myself that I could have consented in my blacked-out state, cursed myself for binge drinking, questioned whether I had given you the wrong idea. I held onto that shame and guilt, as though it was ever mine to carry," she wrote.

Then she learned something that changed her mind. The student had spread the news among their friends that they'd had a "hook-up," Talley wrote.

She waited two years, then reported the assault to the university days before graduating in 2016.

"My course load was strenuous," said Talley, who graduated with a degree in human biology. "I didn't know any other way than to put it by the wayside."

Talley said her experience as an American Indian influenced her decision to report the assault to the university instead of law enforcement. "As a Karuk person, I've seen a lot of police violence. I've seen the system fail, and I don't have a lot of trust."

Like all universities governed by Title IX, the federal civil rights law that outlaws sex discrimination on campuses, Stanford has a system for handling allegations of sexual misconduct, from harassment to assault. The system lets them investigate, hold hearings and mete out discipline. It doesn't have the force of law.

In December 2016, a three-member hearing panel — chosen from a pool of faculty, staff and graduate students — concluded unanimously, as required, that Talley's former friend had sexually assaulted her.

"The preponderance of the evidence indicates that (he) committed sexual assault by virtue of (her) state of incapacitation," the panel wrote.

Talley asked that the student be expelled, noting that "since I was drunk, I could not give consent."

In cases of intoxication, California criminal law says a rape has occurred if the person is prevented from resisting because he or she is drunk — and that the accused knew or reasonably should have known.

Stanford's policy in 2014, the year of Talley's assault, said that a person must consent to sexual intercourse — and that a drunk person cannot give consent.

Stanford graduate Sinead Talley wrote in her 2016 appeal, "Providing my rapist with a gracious invitation back to Stanford pending a brief period of 'reflection' disrespects myself and the moral stature of Stanford as an institution." Photo: Liz Hafalia / The Chronicle

Stanford graduate Sinead Talley wrote in her 2016 appeal, "Providing my rapist with a gracious invitation back to Stanford pending a brief period of 'reflection' disrespects myself and the moral stature of Stanford as an institution."

The student argued in his written statement that he believed Talley had consented.

"Sadly, I was intoxicated, too, so my judgment was impaired," he wrote in his defense. "I had no idea that she was in a blackout. ... I thought I was having consensual sex."

The panel wrote: "We believe a reasonable, sober person would have recognized (Talley's) incapacitation, her inability to understand the nature of the sexual situation, and thus her inability to give consent."

The panel agreed the sexual assault occurred but that the student did not know she was intoxicated and decided that expelling him was “not appropriate.”

Instead, it imposed a two-quarter suspension, with training in consent and the effects of alcohol.

“It is our sincere hope that this very serious sanction will enable (him) to return to Stanford fully committed to maintaining the integrity and safety” of the community, the panel wrote.

The student’s suspension was to begin after he completed another suspension “currently in place,” according to the 2016 record.

Miranda, Stanford’s spokesman, declined to explain the other suspension but said it was not for sexual misconduct.

He said the student never returned to Stanford.

The question of whether Stanford should expel students who sexually assault their classmates erupted on campus in spring 2014, when a student named Leah Francis organized rallies to protest the university’s handling of the issue. That spring, campus investigators determined that a student had sexually assaulted Francis in January. He was suspended briefly and allowed to earn a degree.

The Francis case energized protesters, who rallied on campus. An additional 7,000 people signed a petition urging the university to expel every student found responsible for sexual assault.

Leah’s case shook Stanford,” said Tessa Ormenyi, who graduated with Francis in 2014 and co-founded #StandWithLeah.

Soon another case shook the university — and the world — after Turner, the Stanford swimmer, sexually assaulted a woman outside a frat party in January 2015. This time, the anonymous victim, calling herself Emily Doe, brought criminal charges. At the sentencing hearing that June, Doe read aloud a letter she’d written to Turner describing the depths to which his crime had affected her.

Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky sentenced Turner to six months in county jail.

Social media went wild, criticizing the sentence as a wrist slap. At graduation, several students carried signs condemning their school. “Stanford protects rapists,” read one. “150 years of rape culture,” read another, referring to the age of the venerable university. The Turner case also prompted California lawmakers to expand the state’s definition of rape.

Dauber gathered nearly 100,000 signatures in support of a ballot measure to recall the judge. In June, Persky became the first California judge in 86 years to be voted out of office, with 60 percent of the vote against him.

Amid it all, Stanford convened a task force to study its response to sexual misconduct. Then, in February 2016, university officials enacted a policy making expulsion the “expected sanction” for sexual assault. But they did so only after narrowing the definition of sexual assault.

Under the new rules, anyone accused of having sex with an incapacitated person — someone too drunk to give consent, for example — must have caused the incapacitation or have “knowingly taken advantage of” an incapacitated person to be found responsible for sexual assault.

Those rules now make it nearly impossible for any Stanford student to be held responsible for sexual assault, said Emma Tsurkov, a doctoral student in sociology, who serves as the student government’s representative on sexual violence.

“The easy way to get out of it is for the (accused) person to say they didn’t know” the victim was incapacitated, she said.

In Talley’s case, that’s what her assailant told the panel that would decide his punishment.

When it declined to expel the student, Talley appealed.

The appeal officer offered a summary of the hearing panel’s reason for finding the student responsible for sexual assault in the first place. The panel found that Talley “had consumed a large amount of alcohol and, given her diminutive stature, compounded by the lack of sleep and skipped meals, was unable to give consent. The panel further found that although (he) may not have known that (she) was incapacitated, a reasonably sober person would have known.”

In rejecting Talley’s request, the appeal officer said the panel had “reasonably concluded that (he) neither induced nor knowingly took advantage of an incapacitated person.”

Tsurkov called the panel’s decision troubling.

“The fact that we do not expel people who commit sexual assault means we tolerate their presence in our community,” she said. “I don’t think people walk around on campus contemplating rape. But in the moment, if they thought they could lose their place at Stanford — that they could get expelled — I think that could have a deterring effect.”

Stanford signed an agreement with Talley in March to reimburse her for fees associated with the case, provide mental health counseling for five years, and pay her \$10,000 for that purpose. It also agreed to hear her feedback about the university’s process.

At a recent visit to the San Francisco office of her lawyer, Michael Bien, Talley appeared disheartened.

“To get to the end and have them say, ‘Yeah, we unanimously agree, he definitely assaulted you’ — and that warrants zero action,” was beyond stressful, she said.

The outcome “is not disappointing,” she added. “It’s criminal.”

Over 22 women, like Ghislaine Maxwell Ghislaine Maxwell trawl Stanford's high-end art galleries, tech parties and auction houses for pretty ‘gallerinas’ to have sex with Jeffrey Epstein-like Silicon Valley venture capitalists and tech CEO's. She was based out of John Doerr’s Kleiner Perkins office parties. Chinese and Russian mobsters place young women at Stanford University and Stanford events to spy on tech developments and to try to sex up or marry influential tech CEO's. Websites like "*Seeking Arrangements*" have hundreds of ads from young co-eds at Stanford offering sex for money.

Multiple women have claimed that The President of Stanford University would send "young, fashion model-type co-eds who were naturally large breasted"... to Larry Ellison as "interns", for which Ellison would make a cash contribution to Stanford University. The feature film "*The Social Network*", depicts a program of mini buses which deliver young sorority girls to Stanford frat houses for date rape parties where the girls are given drinks with drugs in them.

Ghislaine Maxwell would trawl high-end art galleries and auction houses looking to find so-called 'Gallerinas' to meet **Jeffrey Epstein**, a former friend has claimed.

Ms Maxwell regularly attended events at Christie's and Sotheby's on both sides of the Atlantic, the friend said.

'She would go to every art gallery opening and was a familiar presence at auctions and parties at Christie's and Sotheby's,' the friend said.

'The art world is full of pretty young girls and many of them are young and broke.

'You'd see her everywhere, often with beautiful blonde girls in tow.'

During a party at Christie's in London, she was spotted talking to Clementine Hambro, one of Princess Diana's bridesmaids, who this week admitted to twice flying on Epstein's 'Lolita Express' private jet.

'I was young, naive and lucky to escape,' Hambro said.

Maria Farmer, one of serial paedophile Epstein's victims, says she was 'picked up' by Epstein and Maxwell at a 1995 show to celebrate her graduation from the New York Academy of Art.

Epstein is also believed to have met Shelley Lewis – dubbed his 'secret girlfriend' – when she was working in the Contemporary Art Department at Christie's in New York in the late 1990s.

Maxwell is currently in custody awaiting trial in the US for allegedly enticing and trafficking minors and sex trafficking and committing perjury.

She denies all the claims.

Ghislaine Maxwell attended events at Christie's and Sotheby's in the UK and US. Ms Maxwell talked to Clementine Hambro, one of Princess Diana's bridesmaids. Hambro admitted to twice flying on Jeffrey Epstein's 'Lolita Express' private jet

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Maxwell regularly supplied young girls to Kleiner Perkins executives and is photographed at Kleiner Perkins parties.

Sex was had in conference rooms, at the Rosewood Hotel, The Four Seasons Hotel and at various private homes in Woodside, California.

Often, The Coulter Art Gallery, The Anderson Collection Gallery And The Tesla Motors Stanford showroom parties have as many hookers and female execu-pimps as they do art enthusiasts.

Many of the women that have crafted their careers around getting young girls for rich Silicon Valley men do so under the guise of running a "charity". If the tech executive makes a "donation" to the 'Save The African Blow-Fish Foundation', or some such nonsense charity, of \$20,000.00, they get 3 young interns sent to their home for an "interview". Most of these women were PR execs at tech companies or the divorced wives of tech oligarchs who made connections when they were married to a Google or Facebook executive.

John Doerr and many others have been caught bribing Stanford to get special favors. [Ghislaine Maxwell](#) was very involved with Doerr and other Kleiner execs according to former employees of Kleiner including Ellen Pao.

Stanford University has had an inordinate number of staff sex scandals, campus rapes and cover-ups. Stanford loves to make it look like it is doing something about the sex industry on-campus while doing nothing. If rich guys thought there was no more repercussion-free sex exploitation at Stanford, they would stop coming. The profit motive keeps the seedy world of execu-sex running hot on the lush Stanford campus.

Stanford's Built-In Racism

Aside from the almost total lack of black scientists at Stanford, another race issue has come forth:

STANFORD UNIVERSITY NOW DISCRIMINATING AGAINST ANOTHER GROUP OF APPLICANTS

A Justice Department and a public investigation is looking at how Stanford University is illegally discriminating against Asian American and white applicants, in violation of federal civil rights law.

The findings could be detailed in a letter to the college's attorneys aimed at rooting out discrimination in the college application process, following complaints from students about the application process at some Ivy League colleges, Stanford in particular. The Justice Department had previously filed court papers siding with Asian American groups who had levied similar allegations against Harvard University.

A two-year investigation concluded that Yale "rejects scores of Asian American and white applicants each year based on their race, whom it otherwise would admit," the Justice Department said.

In a related case, "Yale's race discrimination imposes undue and unlawful penalties on racially-disfavored applicants, including in particular Asian American and White applicants," Assistant Attorney General Eric Dreiband, who heads the department's civil rights division, wrote in a letter to the college's attorneys.

Prosecutors found that Yale has been discriminating against applicants to its undergraduate program based on their race and national origin and "that race is the determinative factor in hundreds of admissions decisions each year." The investigation concluded that Asian American and white students have "only one-tenth to one-fourth of the likelihood of admission as African American applicants with comparable academic credentials," the Justice Department said.

"Unlawfully dividing Americans into racial and ethnic blocs fosters stereotypes, bitterness, and division," Dreiband said in a statement. "It is past time for American institutions to recognize that all people should be treated with decency and respect and without unlawful regard to the color of their skin."

The investigation also found that Yale uses race as a factor in multiple steps of the admissions process and that Yale "racially balances its classes."

The Supreme Court has ruled colleges and universities may consider race in admissions decisions but has said that must be done in a narrowly tailored way to promote diversity and should be limited in time. Schools also bear the burden of showing why their consideration of race is appropriate.

In a statement, Yale said it "categorically denies this allegation," has cooperated fully with the investigation and has been continually turning over "a substantial amount of information and data."

“Given our commitment to complying with federal law, we are dismayed that the DOJ has made its determination before allowing Yale to provide all the information the Department has requested thus far,” the university said in a statement. “Had the Department fully received and fairly weighed this information, it would have concluded that Yale’s practices absolutely comply with decades of Supreme Court precedent.”

The university said it considers a multitude of factors and looks at “the whole person when selecting whom to admit among the many thousands of highly qualified applicants.”

“We are proud of Yale’s admissions practices, and we will not change them on the basis of such a meritless, hasty accusation,” the statement said.

The Justice Department has demanded that Yale immediately stop and agree not to use race or national origin for upcoming admissions. The government also says that if Yale proposes that it will continue to use race or national origin as a factor in future admission cycles, the college must first submit a plan to the Justice Department “demonstrating its proposal is narrowly tailored as required by law, including by identifying a date for the end of race discrimination.”

The Justice Department has also [previously raised similar concerns](#) about Harvard University, which prosecutors accused of “engaging in outright racial balancing,” siding with Asian American students in a lawsuit who allege the Ivy League school discriminated against them.

A federal judge in 2019 [cleared Harvard](#) of discriminating against Asian American applicants in a ruling that was seen as a major victory for supporters of affirmative action in college admissions across the U.S. That ruling has been appealed and arguments are scheduled for next month.

In the Harvard case, the Justice Department had argued that the university went too far in its use of race, but the judge disagreed. Though the Supreme Court has ruled that colleges’ use of race in admissions must be “narrowly tailored” and can be only a “plus factor,” past rulings still give colleges wide latitude in considering a wide range of factors, including race, as they build their classes.

Stanford University-created Tech companies say they value diversity, but reports show they lie and are inherently racist Stanford frat-boy elitist scams

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Key Points

- Mega-cap tech companies began publishing annual diversity reports in 2014. But few have made much ground, especially in hiring Black employees.
- Facebook, for example, has gone from a workforce that’s 3% Black to 3.8% in the past six years. Others also are in the low single digits.

- This week, tech CEOs pledged to do better and committed millions in grants. But critics say it “rings hollow” until it shows up in the data.

Prominent tech companies have made little progress in their stated goal of hiring more minorities. Six years after their first diversity reports, [Alphabet](#), [Apple](#), [Facebook](#), [Microsoft](#) and [Twitter](#) have seen low single-digit increases in their percentage of Black employees, according to a CNBC analysis of the annual disclosures. [Amazon](#) shows a higher increase, but those numbers include warehouse and delivery workers.

“Every year they put out the same diversity report, check the box, then send out the same report the next year,” said Freada Kapor Klein, founding partner at Kapor Capital. “We’re at a crucial crossroads — I don’t think what tech companies have done to date is anywhere near enough.”

In 2014, tech companies [acknowledged](#) the gap and made it a public goal to increase diversity in their workforces. In recent weeks, major tech CEOs renewed vows to tackle inequality after public outrage over the killing of George Floyd, an unarmed Black man who died after a white Minneapolis police officer knelt on his neck for nine minutes. Protests have erupted in cities across the U.S. in the weeks since.

Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg wrote in a post that the company “needs to do more to support equality and safety for the Black community through our platforms,” pledging to donate \$10 million. Twitter’s Jack Dorsey pledged \$3 million to former NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernick’s Know Your Rights Camp, and Amazon promised \$10 million to support social justice and Black communities. Google pledged \$12 million to civil rights groups, Apple CEO Tim Cook promised the company would make donations to several groups such as the Equal Justice Initiative and match employee donations, while Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella pledged \$1.5 million to several social justice organizations, adding the company will be using its platform to “amplify” the voices of its Black workers.

Kapor Klein, also a founding team member at Project Include, pointed to prior levels of spending at tech companies for diversity and inclusion, and statements by executives. Those “ring hollow,” she said, until bigger changes show up in the diversity data.

‘Metrics, but no consequences’

In the past six years, these companies have made improvements but are nowhere near parity.

Women have moved up as a higher fraction of the workforce. Facebook’s technical workforce, for example, jumped from 15% female when the report began in 2014 to 23% at the beginning of 2019. Google has made similar progress.

But for Black employees, Facebook showed the smallest increase — going from 3% to 3.8% of workers in the past five years. Twitter moved from roughly 2% Black employees in its workforce in 2014, to 6% as of the start of 2019. Amazon reported an 11 percentage point jump, with a workforce that was 26.5% Black as of the start of 2019. However, the majority of its employees work in Amazon distribution centers, making it difficult to compare with its tech peers.

Bari Williams, head of legal at start-up Human Interest and former lead senior counsel at Facebook, said the annual reports are a key step in transparency. But tech giants' data-centric approach and competitiveness haven't been effective when it comes to diversity.

“These companies are data-driven, but if people are not hitting their diversity metrics, where's the downside?” Williams said. “You have metrics, but no consequences.”

Among leadership and technical roles like coders and engineers, the diversity numbers are even lower. Apple's workforce is 9% Black — but that drops to 3% when looking at leadership roles. Its share of Black technical workers remained flat at 6% from the end of 2013 through the end of 2017, the last year Apple published diversity data.

“One flaw is not thinking about it from the outset of the company formation, that's having ripple effects that are now being seen several years later,” said Richard Kerby, general partner at Equal Ventures. “You're not seeing movement because it's not being tracked or monitored — there's no incentive alignment for someone to improve on the numbers.”

Employee retention

While hiring remains an area of focus for inclusion, Margaret Neale, Stanford University professor emerita in organizational behavior, said it's just as often an issue of retention. Finding a mentor or a sponsor within a company can be difficult. Without one, it can be nearly impossible to ascend to a leadership role.

“We see the same kind of diversity reports from a variety of different tech companies, what you see very clearly is that there's very little change,” she said. “There continues to be hiring, but there's not stickiness to those hires. There's a substantial shedding of folks of color at much higher proportions given the total numbers that exist.”

In response to CNBC's requests for comment, the tech companies pointed to incremental progress. Last year, Google showed its largest increase recorded in hiring Black tech employees in the U.S. At Apple, 53% of new hires in the U.S. are from historically underrepresented groups in tech.


Despite the single-digit improvements, critics still applaud effort to publish these reports out, pointing to industries like Wall Street that don't publish diversity data on an annual basis.

Kapor Klein said it continues to be an uphill battle to “retrofit diversity into a big company.” Thanks to their growth in the past two decades, tech giants now have what she called a “denominator problem” of changing a 118,000 person workforce in the case of Alphabet.

“Moving the needle by 10% is a lot, that means a lot of employees have to be hired or a lot have to leave, and it still doesn’t change the culture,” she said. “Companies have a much harder task and it requires an absolute fundamental commitment to change.”

[WATCH: Former Time Warner CEO Dick Parsons on fighting injustice and inequality in corporate America](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/12/joanna-hoffman-facebook-is-peddling-an-addictive-drug-called-anger.html)

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Acknowledgments

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